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Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible
Confessions
Brian R. Gallini*
Nearly all confessions obtained by interrogators nationwide are inadmissible, but
nonetheless admitted. In the process, police arrest the wrong suspect and allow the guilty to
go free. An unshakeable addiction to pseudo-scientific interrogation methods—initially
created in the 1940s—is to blame. The so-called “Reid technique” of interrogation was
initially a welcome and revolutionary change from the violent “third degree” method it
replaced. But we no longer live in the 1940s and, not surprisingly, we no longer drive 1940s
automobiles, practice early-twentieth-century medicine, or dial rotary phones. Why, then,
are police still using 1940s methods of interrogation?
Moreover, the outdated Reid technique was premised on the very same principles that
underlie the lie detector. At the time of its creation, then, the Reid technique was crafted
from a “science” already discredited by nearly every court in the nation. From a policy
standpoint, continued reliance on the Reid technique does a disservice to our justice system
and unnecessarily risks obtaining inherently unreliable confessions. From an evidentiary
standpoint, the methodology underlying the Reid technique fails every aspect of the Supreme
Court’s standards governing the admission of expert evidence. This Article therefore
contends that all confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid method are—and were—
absolutely inadmissible.
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Introduction
Kill your woman and a good detective will come close to real tears as he
touches your shoulder and tells you how he knows that you must have loved
her, that it wouldn’t be so hard for you to talk about if you didn’t. Beat your
child to death and a police detective will wrap his arm around you in the
interrogation room, telling you about how he beats his own children all the
time, how it wasn’t your fault if the kid up and died on you. Shoot a friend
over a poker hand and that same detective will lie about your dead buddy’s
condition, telling you that the victim is in stable condition at Hopkins and
probably won’t press charges, which wouldn’t amount to more than assault
with intent even if he does. Murder a man with an accomplice and the
detective will walk your co-conspirator past the open door of your
interrogation room, then say your bunky’s going home tonight because he
gave a statement making you the triggerman. And if that same detective
thinks you can be bluffed, he might tell you that they’ve got your prints on
the weapon, or that there are two eyewitnesses who have picked your photo
from an array, or that the victim made a dying declaration in which he
named you as his assailant.1

How do detectives know these tricks? Intuition? Luck? On-the-job
experience? Perhaps it is one or all of those reasons, but more than likely
investigators learned these techniques from John E. Reid & Associates—
1. David Simon, Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets 203 (1991).
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teachers of “the leading interview and interrogation approach used today in
both the law enforcement and business communities.”2 Premised on the use of
nine specific steps, “the Reid technique,” as it is known, is designed to identify
the guilty without inducing false confessions.3 But how can the Reid technique
be sure to distinguish true from false confessions? Moreover, what supporting
data did John E. Reid and his colleague, Fred E. Inbau, have at the time they
authored their interrogation manual that rendered them authorities on
psychology in the interrogation room? The answers may surprise you: The
Reid technique cannot distinguish between true and false confessions. Reid and
Inbau had no supporting scientific or experimental data.
In other words, the so-called validity of the Reid technique is illusory; it
is simply a medium to bolster interrogators’ belief that they have an advantage
over their suspect. And as to the backgrounds of Reid and Inbau, suffice it to
say for now that they were no psychologists.
Created in a time when the “third degree” method of interrogation was
waning in popularity,4 the Reid technique was initially a welcome and
revolutionary change from the violent methods it replaced.5 Before the first
iteration in 1942 of what became the Reid technique,6 officers interrogating
suspects often got the suspect to “come clean” by resorting to barbaric tactics
like using their bare fists, stripping the suspect naked, threatening the suspect,
or depriving him of food and water.7
A classic example of the “third degree” appears in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chambers v. Florida, which described the May 13, 1933, robbing
and murder of an elderly white man in Pompano, Florida.8 Concerned about an
increasingly “enraged community,”9 Broward County police rounded up and
2. John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Company Information, http://www.reid.com/r_about.html (last
visited Jan. 12, 2010).
3. Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 212 (4th ed. 2001) (“It must be
remembered that none of the steps is apt to make an innocent person confess . . . .”).
4. The National Commission on Law Observance in Law Enforcement issued a Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement to President Herbert Hoover in 1931 documenting and decrying the use of the third
degree. See Nat’l Comm. on Law Observance & Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement
(1931) [hereinafter “Wickersham Report,” named for its chair]; see also Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree
and the Origins of Psychological Interrogation in the United States, in 20 Interrogations, Confessions, and
Entrapment 37, 42 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (“The ‘third degree’ is an overarching term that refers to a
variety of coercive interrogation strategies, ranging from psychological duress such as prolonged confinement
to extreme physical violence and torture.”).
5. Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Fred Inbau, 89, Criminologist Who Perfected Interrogation, N.Y. Times,
May 28, 1998, at B9 (crediting Inbau for developing a method of interrogation to replace the “third degree”);
see Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force 51 (1993)
(calling Inbau and Reid leaders of the reformist movement away from third degree practices); see also John F.
Keenan, Memories of Professor Fred E. Inbau, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1281, 1281 (1999) (“Inbau was a
giant in the field of criminal law who left a legacy that will be remembered well into the next millennium.”).
6. Fred E. Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 71–118 (1942) (outlining a series of
techniques for criminal interrogations).
7. See, e.g., Wickersham Report, supra note 4, at 61–63.
8. 309 U.S. 227, 229 (1940).
9. Id. (quoting Chambers v. State, 187 So. 156, 157 (Fla. 1939)).
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arrested between twenty-five to forty African Americans within twenty-four
hours after the killing.10 The investigation gradually began to focus on the four
petitioners who, along with the other arrestees, endured a weeklong
interrogation.11 During that time, officers repeatedly questioned petitioners,
oftentimes in the presence of between four to ten white guards.12 As the
investigation wore on, officers elected to question petitioners during an “all
night vigil.”13 At no point during their week-long interrogation were petitioners
allowed to confer with counsel or chat with a friend.14 Instead, the evidence
suggested that petitioners were denied food and sleep, continuously threatened,
and mistreated until they finally agreed to confess.15 The Court, in condemning
the officers’ methods as an unconstitutional violation of petitioners’ Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights, scornfully emphasized that “no such practice
as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his death .”16
The facts of Chambers nicely illustrate the brutal reality of interrogations
in the early 1900s.17 The Reid method therefore filled a gaping hole in
interrogation methods, or, perhaps more accurately, the absence of
interrogation methods.18 In 1942, Northwestern University law professor Fred
Inbau laid the foundation for what ironically became the Reid method in his
publication titled Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation.19 After John Reid
began a working relationship with Inbau, the pair revised Inbau’s earlier work
and published Criminal Interrogation and Confessions in 1962.20 Now in its
fourth edition,21 the jointly authored publication now often known simply as
“the Manual” is widely viewed as the predominant interrogation training tool
in the country.22

10. Id.
11. Id. at 230.
12. Id. at 231.
13. Id. at 230. The interrogation sessions were so long that the supervising sheriff was unable to
interrogate the arrestees at night because he was too tired. Id.
14. Id. at 231.
15. Id. at 233–35.
16. Id. at 241.
17. Indeed, the Wickersham Report documents 106 usages of the third degree from thirty-one separate
state jurisdictions and four federal circuits. See Wickersham Report, supra note 4, at 53. Yet the Report
cautioned that such numbers were hardly accurate given that learning about usages of the third degree was the
exception rather than the rule. Id. at 53–54.
18. To be fair, W.R. Kidd published the first police interrogation training manual in American history in
1940. See Leo, supra note 4, at 39–40.
19. Inbau, supra note 6, at 71–118.
20. See Fred E. Inbau & John E. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962).
21. Inbau et al., supra note 3.
22. See, e.g., Carol Tavris & Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify
Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts 141 (2007) (characterizing the Reid and Inbau text as “[t]he
Bible of interrogation methods”); Welsh S. White, MIRANDA’s Waning Protections 25 (2001) (“Of all the
interrogation manuals, the Inbau Manual, as it is commonly known, has been the most influential.”); Miriam
S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive
Interrogation Techniques, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 791, 808 (2006) (“The interrogation method most widely
publicized and probably most widely used is known as the Reid Technique . . . .”); Leo, supra note 4, at 63
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The Manual, and the techniques it teaches, are hardly without detractors.
For the most part, scholars focus on the potential for certain interrogation
methods endorsed by the Manual to induce suspects to confess falsely.23 Yet
no article has examined, on a more basic level, whether Reid and Inbau
possessed the requisite background necessary to credibly author the “Bible” of
interrogation manuals. Surely the Reid method’s long-proffered contention that
it brings science into the interrogation room correspondingly suggests that it is
rooted in science.24 Hardly.25 This Article tells the story of Reid and Inbau’s

(noting that the Criminal Interrogation and Confessions text is “the most well-known and influential in the
United States”); Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2557,
2560 (2008) (“The most influential current training method for law enforcement is the Reid technique,
outlined in Reid and Inbau’s book Criminal Interrogation and Confessions.”); Charles Weisselberg, Mourning
Miranda, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519, 1532 (2008) (“The largest national provider of training in interrogation
techniques is Chicago-based John E. Reid & Associates.”); Marvin Zalman & Brad Smith, The Attitudes of
Police Executives Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 873, 919 (2007)
(“[W]e believe [that the training provided by Reid & Associates] is the largest and best-known training
program for police interrogations.”); see also Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of
Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc’y
189, 190 (1997) (referring to the Inbau and Reid manual as “the most popular police training manual”); John
E. Reid & Associates Company Information, supra note 2 (“Our book, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions
(4th edition, 2001) is considered by the courts and practitioners to be the ‘Bible’ for interviewing and
interrogation techniques.”).
23. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr.
2010); Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 623, 628 (2007);
see also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
Stan. L. Rev. 21, 58 (1987) (“The cases in which we believe an innocent person was convicted on the basis of
a false confession range from those in which the police used ‘third degree’ methods to others where less brutal
tactics were employed.”).
24. See United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (“By 1966, [Reid] began
advocating the acceptance of polygraph tests as reliable scientific evidence.”); Fred E. Inbau (1909–1998)
Papers, Series 17/28, at 1 (Nw. Univ. Archives, 1930–1998) (unpublished papers) [hereinafter Inbau Papers]
(“[E]very step in the promotion of scientific crime detection is a step towards the abolition of cruel and
ineffective methods of establishing criminal identity, and also a step towards the realization of criminal trial
unhampered by technical procedure and unreliable evidence.” (quoting Fred E. Inbau, Science Versus the
Criminal,
NU
Alumni
News,
Jan.
1935,
at
25)),
available
at
http://
www.library.northwestern.edu/archives/findingaids/fred_inbau.pdf; see also, e.g., Inbau & Reid, supra note
20, at vii (“Criminal Interrogation and Confessions is devoted to a discussion of the psychological tactics and
techniques of effective interrogation . . . .”); Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, III, Criminal Interrogation
Techniques on Trial, Security Mgmt., Oct. 1, 1992, at 64 (arguing that Reid interrogation techniques represent
necessary “highly sophisticated psychological techniques”); Leo, supra note 4, at 63 (observing that even
Inbau’s first interrogation text in 1942 “attempted to establish a scientific basis for police interrogation in order
to eradicate the use of threatening or abusive tactics from interrogation”).
25. See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions, and Testimony 48
(1992) (observing that the Reid technique, among other manuals, is “based on experience rather than objective
and scientific data”); Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judgments
of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 499, 512 (1999) (conducting a
study on the validity of the Reid technique and concluding that it “may not be effective—and, indeed, may be
counterproductive—as a method of distinguishing truth and deception”); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo,
The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 979, 986 n.38
(1997) (“Police trainers and interrogation manuals mislead detectives into believing that they can divine
whether a suspect is innocent or guilty from simple non-verbal and behavioral responses to their questions.”).
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work, individually and collectively, and concludes that all of it is, at base,
premised on nothing.
The story of Reid and Inbau’s work also reveals that the so-called ninestep Reid technique (and the Behavior Analysis Interview that precedes it) is
no different from the lie-detector technique—also created by Reid and Inbau.
Given courts’ proper unwillingness to admit the results of a lie-detector test,26
this Article contends that future courts should be similarly unwilling to admit
confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid technique. This Article further
asserts that all past confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid technique were
based on “junk science” and therefore never should have been admitted against
the confessing defendant.
Part I details the nine steps of the outdated Reid technique.27 Part II
details the biographical and professional stories of Fred E. Inbau and John E.
Reid. In doing so, Part II takes a critical look at the empirical basis for their
research on interrogation methods and their development of the polygraph

26. Federal courts are disinclined to admit polygraph evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d
836, 846 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Our cases make clear polygraph evidence is disfavored.”); United States v.
Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 469 n.8 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Admission of polygraph evidence is disfavored in this
Circuit . . . .”); United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003) (reaffirming inadmissibility of
polygraph evidence); United States v. Messina, 131 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to admit polygraph
results in sentencing proceedings); United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
polygraph evidence inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because of its potential to mislead
and confuse the jury); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (disallowing polygraph
evidence on Rule 403 basis); Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 662–63 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Palmer v.
City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding polygraph evidence inadmissible pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because of its potential to mislead and confuse the jury).
State courts are equally skeptical. See, e.g., Bloom v. People, 185 P.3d 797, 807 (Colo. 2008) (“Th[e]
per se ban is an evidentiary rule rooted in the concern that polygraph evidence will prejudice the jury’s
evaluation of a witness’s credibility.”); Thornton v. State, 620 S.E.2d 356, 360 (Ga. 2005) (“The results of a
polygraph examination are inadmissible except by stipulation of the parties . . . .”); Wilkins v. State, 190 P.3d
957, 970 (Kan. 2008) (“[R]eference to [a polygraph] examination . . . is prohibited.”); State v. Foret, 628 So.
2d 1116, 1128 (La. 1993) (excluding polygraph testimony because it would infringe upon the province of the
jury); State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 690 (Minn. 2008) (“Polygraph examinations are inadmissible.”); State
ex rel. Kemper v. Vincent, 191 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Mo. 2006) (“The results of a polygraph examination generally
are inadmissible in Missouri criminal trials.”); State v. Hameline, 188 P.3d 1052, 1055 (Mont. 2008)
(“[P]olygraph results are inadmissible . . . .”); State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 232 (Or. 1987); Darling v. State,
262 S.W.3d 913, 920 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (“The results of a polygraph examination are generally
inadmissible for any reason because such testing is inherently unreliable.”); Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 663
S.E.2d 98, 101–02 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] polygraph examination has no proper evidentiary use . . . .”
(quoting Bennett v. Commonwealth, 511 S.E.2d 439, 445 (Va. Ct. App. 1999))).
27. The techniques currently suggested by the Reid method are nearly identical to those promoted by
Fred E. Inbau in 1942. Compare Inbau et al., supra note 3, with Inbau & Reid, supra note 20, and Leo, supra
note 4, at 72 (“[T]he modern version of Inbau et al., manual (1986, 2001) has reorganized the interrogation
techniques it advocates from the earlier individualized, trial and error or scattershot approach to a ‘Nine-step’
model of systematic and unfolding pressure, persuasion, deception and manipulation.”). Perhaps it is hardly a
stretch to suggest that modern interrogators are, at base, relying on techniques created in the 1940s. Yet surely
the law, the sophistication of criminals, and, more importantly, psychological research has developed since
then. The Reid method’s failure to adapt to these critical developments provides an early indication of its
infirmity.
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technique.28 From that examination, Part II first concludes that the
backgrounds of Inbau and Reid reflect their inability to credibly create or
suggest a “scientific” approach to interrogation. Part II then concludes that the
Reid technique lacks empirical support.
With those conclusions as background, Part III tests the Reid method’s
claimed basis in “science.” Given that the Reid technique mirrors a polygraph
test by attempting to create human lie detectors29 and that polygraph results are
inadmissible in court, Part III first argues that confessions obtained pursuant to
the Reid technique should similarly be inadmissible. Wholly apart from the
relationship between the polygraph and the Reid technique, however, Part III
further contends that the Reid method’s claimed scientific basis requires that it
comport with the Supreme Court’s standards for admitting expert evidence any
time prosecutors seek to introduce a confession obtained by an interrogator
trained in that method. Given that the Reid technique is in fact not based on
any generally accepted scientific method, Part III contends that all officer
testimony about confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid technique was—and
is—inadmissible. Regardless of the underlying theory, though, the startling
final conclusion is obvious: all confessions taken pursuant to the Reid method
are in fact inadmissible.

I. The Reid Technique Explained
The prevalence of the nine-step Reid technique—as taught in seminars
and described in the Criminal Interrogation and Confessions text—cannot be
overstated.30 Indeed, John E. Reid & Associates is the largest, best-known
provider of interrogation training in the United States.31 Officers from every

28. The technique in its modern day form “collects physiological data from at least three systems in the
human
body.”
American
Polygraph
Association,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://
www.polygraph.org/section/resources/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). First,
“[c]onvoluted rubber tubes that are placed over the examinee’s chest and abdominal area will record
respiratory activity. [Then,] [t]wo small metal plates, attached to the fingers, will record sweat gland activity,
and a blood pressure cuff, or similar device will record cardiovascular activity.” Id.
29. Leo, supra note 4, at 66 (“The Behavioral Analysis Interview is premised on the same behavioral
assumptions and underlying theory as the so-called lie-detector: The Behavioral Analysis Interview teaches
interrogators that it is their job to act, in effect, as a human polygraph—an endeavor that may be fraught with
even more potential for error than the lie detector itself.”).
30. Although there are of course competing training manuals, they too generally follow principles that
are aligned with the Reid method. See Christine S. Scott-Hawyward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions:
Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31 Law & Psychol. Rev. 53, 66–67 (2007) (stating that
eighty-five percent of all interrogation manuals recommend a two-step process to determine guilt or innocence,
just as the Reid method instructs). Indeed, in a recent survey of police investigators from California, Texas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Florida, and Canada, investigators cited to the same room setup and interrogation
techniques listed by the Reid method, regardless of whether the respondent knew the Reid name. See Saul M.
Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31
Law & Hum. Behav. 381, 389 (2007).
31. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The Police Law Institute, a proprietary school, trains and
provides instructional manuals to police in Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, and Florida. See The Police Law Institute,
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state and Canadian province use the Reid method.32 A recent nationwide
survey of police departments revealed that two-thirds of state police
departments train some or all of their department’s officers in the Reid
method.33 The Reid technique also claims international reach: according to the
most recent edition of Reid and Inbau’s Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions, “[t]he technique is now taught in seminars across the United
States, Canada, Europe, and Asia.”34 Even the United States military law
enforcement uses the Reid technique.35 In total, Reid & Associates boasts that
over 500,000 law enforcement and security professionals have attended its
interrogation seminars since they were first offered in 1974.36 It seems, then,
that no critique of the Reid method could begin without first examining it in
some detail.
The training seminars described in the preceding paragraph are of course
grounded in the Reid textbook, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions.37 The
extensive 626-page interrogation training manual begins by distinguishing an
“interview” from an “interrogation.”38 An interview, according to the text, is a
nonaccusatory information gathering exercise that may take place at the
beginning of an investigation and in a variety of environments.39 The
interview, more specifically described by the text as a “Behavior Analysis
Interview,”40 should be “free flowing and relatively unstructured” in order to
allow the interviewer to collect unanticipated information and make a
credibility determination by evaluating the suspect’s behavioral responses.41
Along the way, the examiner should also “establish a level of rapport and trust
with the suspect that cannot be accomplished during an accusatory
interrogation.”42

http://www.policelawinstitute.org/plims/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). More relevant to this Article, their police
training businesses include John E. Reid & Associates. See Zalman & Smith, supra note 22, at 885 n.68.
32. John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Interviewing and Interrogation, http://www.reid.com/
training_programs/interview_overview.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
33. Zalman & Smith, supra note 22, at 920.
34. Inbau et al., supra note 3, at ix; accord John E. Reid & Associates, Company Information, supra note
2 (“Our firm has been awarded contracts for training from NATO; the Bavarian and Berlin Law Enforcement
communities in Germany; and have conducted training programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Czech Republic;
the United Arab Emerits; Singapore; Japan; Mexico; Canada; Belgium; and, South Korea.”).
35. Peter Kageleiry, Jr., Psychological Police Interrogation Methods: Pseudoscience in the Interrogation
Room Obscures Justice in the Courtroom, 193 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2007).
36. John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Interviewing and Interrogation, supra note 32.
37. Weisselberg, supra note 22, at 1530.
38. Inbau et al., supra note 3, at 5.
39. Id. at 5–6. The interviewer should be someone who has “an easygoing confidence that allows the
subject to feel comfortable telling the truth but uncomfortable lying.” Id. at 67. That suggestion comes under
the heading “Interviewer Qualifications,” yet no substantive interviewer qualifications are mentioned. Id. at
66–67.
40. Id. at 173–91 (chapter describing the Behavior Analysis Interview).
41. Id. at 6–7.
42. Id. at 9.
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By contrast, an interrogation takes place “only when the investigator is
reasonably certain of the suspect’s guilt,” which certainty may arise from “the
suspect’s behavior during an interview.”43 The interrogation itself must occur
in a controlled environment, during which the interrogator displays an air of
unwavering confidence in the suspect’s guilt.44 The interrogator should employ
the nine-step Reid technique, described below, during questioning.45
The moment when a police officer elects to conclude an interview and
commence an interrogation is critical. Given that interrogation is a “guiltpresumptive process,”46 the investigators should make a determination during
the Behavior Analysis Interview about the suspect’s credibility before
commencing a formal interrogation.47 To do so, the investigator should
establish the suspect’s normal behavioral patterns and then—in response to
“behavior-provoking questions”48—evaluate the suspect’s attitudes, verbal
behavior, paralinguistic behavior (i.e., the suspect’s speech characteristics),
and nonverbal behavior.49 In the words of Inbau et al., the examiner must give
“analytical consideration” to the suspect’s “behavioral responses.”50
From a suspect’s responses to between ten to fifteen behavior-provoking
questions, the investigator “will generally be able to classify the overall
responses to those questions as either fitting the description of an innocent or
guilty suspect.”51 And, assuming the investigator is “unable to eliminate a
suspect based on behavior assessments or investigative findings,” that
investigator should hastily follow up with a formal interrogation.52

43. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 7 (“Deceptive suspects are not likely to offer admissions against self-interest unless they are
convinced that the investigator is certain of their guilt.”).
45. The authors emphasize that not every interrogation will require the investigator to employ all nine
steps. Id. at 214. “What is essential for success . . . is for the investigator to recognize what stage a suspect is in
and to respond appropriately to the suspect’s behaviors and psychological orientation at any given stage of the
interrogation process.” Id. at 216.
46. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature
and Issues, Psychol. Sci. Pub. Int., Nov. 2004, at 33, 41.
47. See Inbau et al., supra note 3, at 9 (outlining the importance of interviewing a suspect before
interrogating the suspect).
48. Inbau et al. suggest several behavior-provoking questions, such as the “purpose” question, wherein
the interviewer asks the suspect about his understanding of the purpose for the interview. Id. at 173. Another
example is the “history/you” question, in which the interviewer “should succinctly state the issue under
investigation (history) and ask the subject if he was involved in committing the crime (you).” Id. at 175.
Although Inbau et al. provide numerous other examples, see id. at 176–84, the overarching goal is for the
investigator to discern deceptive responses from guilty suspects. See id. at 173 (“Research has demonstrated
that innocent subjects tend to respond differently to these specialized questions than do deceptive subjects.”).
49. Id. at 128–53.
50. Id. at 173.
51. Id. at 190.
52. Id. at 191. Somewhat confusingly, although the investigator is charged with making a determination
about whether the suspect offers deceptive responses, for “court purposes,” it is “not recommended that the
investigator categorize a suspect’s response to behavior-provoking questions as truthful or deceptive at the
time each question is asked.” Id. at 190 n.2. This type of testimony, according to Inbau et al., is “best left for
an expert in behavior analysis” because a defense attorney could ask the investigator “to explain exactly why
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The Reid technique’s nine-step method comes into play as soon as our
hypothetical investigator elects to follow his Behavior Analysis Interview with
a formal interrogation.53 Before the investigator commences an interrogation,
though, Inbau et al. advise the investigator to set up a private soundproof room
within the police station that is free from distractions and furnished sparsely
with straight-backed chairs.54 The room should also be equipped with a oneway observation mirror so that other detectives can evaluate the suspect’s
“behavior symptoms.”55 Arranging the room in this manner isolates the suspect
and removes the suspect from any familiar surroundings, thereby heightening
the suspect’s anxiety while incentivizing the suspect to extricate himself from
the situation.56
The interrogator should then “allow the suspect to sit in the interview
room alone for about five minutes.”57 Doing so will promote insecurity in the
suspect and cause the suspect “[a]dditional doubts and concerns.”58 The
investigator should also preliminarily “prepare and have on hand an evidence
case folder, or a simulation of one.”59 Doing so will allow the investigator to
make reference to the case file throughout the interrogation, even if the “file”
contains nothing or simply contains blank paper.60
At the outset of the formal interrogation,61 the investigator should enter
with an air of confidence and, if the suspect is not seated, he should instruct the
suspect to sit.62 Step one of the Reid technique then specifically directs the
interrogator to “initiate the interrogation with a direct statement indicating
absolute certainty in the suspect’s guilt.”63 Immediately thereafter, the

he classified each response as he did, to explain the research findings supporting his classification, and to
comment on the differential diagnosis of the response.” Id. At the risk of asking the obvious, why should a
defense attorney not ask this of a testifying investigator when it is the investigator, not a behavioral analysis
expert, who determined that the suspect was not truthful during the interview?
53. In other words, at the point when the investigator becomes—in his opinion—“reasonably certain” of
the suspect’s guilt. Id. at 209.
54. Id. at 57–64.
55. Id. at 59.
56. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 42.
57. Inbau et al., supra note 3, at 216.
58. Id. at 217.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Inbau et al. assures the reader, without a supporting citation (as always), that “[i]t must be
remembered that none of the steps is apt to make an innocent person confess and that all the steps are legally
as well as morally justifiable.” Id. at 212.
62. Id. at 217–18, 221 fig.13–2.
63. Id. at 218–19. “If the suspect perceives that the investigator is not certain of his guilt, he is unlikely to
confess.” Id. at 218. This is a “maximization” technique designed to intimidate and impress upon the suspect
the futility of denial. See Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 219, 261 (2006). Maximization techniques condoned by the Reid
method may also include confronting suspects with real and false evidence, refusing to accept denials,
accusing suspects of lying, identifying inconsistencies in suspects’ stories, and emphasizing the implausibility
of suspects’ claims. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266, 277–
79 (1996).
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interrogator should pause and say, “I want to sit down with you so that we can
get this straightened out. Okay?”64 No matter what the suspect says in
response, “the investigator will proceed to offer a reason as to why it is
important for the suspect to tell the truth.”65
After directly confronting the suspect, step two of the Reid method
directs the interrogator to begin developing a “theme.”66 The theme should
present the suspect with a moral—not legal—excuse for committing the
offense.67 “The selected theme may be based upon a simple, common sense
analysis of a suspect’s background and probable motive that triggered the
criminal conduct.”68 So, if a suspect admits during the Behavior Analysis
Interview that he might be tempted to take money from someone at gunpoint if
he were “desperate,” then the interrogator should consider a theme justifying
the suspect’s commission of robbery out of dire financial need or possible drug
addiction.69 Or, if a suspect suggests during the Behavior Analysis Interview
that certain circumstances may justify a homicide, then the interrogator should
thematically condemn the victim of the suspect’s crime.70 Regardless, this
“minimization”71 technique is designed to “offer a ‘crutch’ for the suspect as
he moves toward a confession.”72
Often, however, the suspect meets the interrogator’s theme presentation
with a denial. The third step therefore counsels interrogators on how to handle
a suspect’s denials either after the direct positive confrontation (step one), or
following the interrogator’s theme presentation (step two).73 Should a denial
follow step one, Inbau et al. advise interrogators to ignore a suspect’s “weak

64. Inbau et al., supra note 3, at 222.
65. Id. at 213.
66. Id. at 232.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 234.
69. Id. More specifically, the investigator might—during the Behavior Analysis Interview—ask the
suspect the following: “[u]nder any circumstances do you think the person who killed George should be given
some consideration?” Id. If the suspect responds that it “depend[s] on why it happened,” then the text suggests
this theme: “The suspect did not plan to kill the victim but rather acted on the spur of the moment because of
the victim’s behavior.” Id.
70. Id. Assuming the interrogator cannot develop a theme from the suspect’s interview behavior or
comments, the Manual suggests seven fallback themes: (1) “Sympathize with the Suspect by Saying that
Anyone Else Under Similar Circumstances Might Have Done the Same Thing,” id. at 241; (2) “Reduce the
Suspect’s Feeling of Guilt by Minimizing the Moral Seriousness of the Offense,” id. at 244; (3) “Suggest a
Less Revolting and More Morally Acceptable Motivation or Reason for the Offense Than That Which Is
Known or Presumed,” id. at 247; (4) “Sympathize with Suspect by Condemning Others,” id. at 254; (5)
“Appeal to a Suspect’s Pride by Well-Selected Flattery,” id. at 268; (6) “Point out Possibility of Exaggeration
on Part of Accuser or Victim, or Exaggerate Nature and Seriousness of the Event Itself,” id. at 271; and (7)
“Point Out to the Suspect Grave Consequences and Futility of Continuation of Criminal Behavior,” id. at 278.
Again, these are the very same unchanged techniques suggested in a somewhat less organized fashion by Inbau
back in 1942. Cf. Inbau, supra note 6.
71. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 43.
72. Inbau et al., supra note 3, at 232.
73. Id. at 305–06.
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denial.”74 Should the suspect offer a more forceful denial, then the investigator
should “reassert his confidence in the suspect’s guilt” while directing the
discussion back to the facts of the case.75 Little changes in the context of a
post-theme denial; the interrogator is advised to evaluate the veracity of the
denial while returning to the interrogation theme.76
Step four addresses how interrogators should respond when a suspect’s
simple denial matures into an “objection.” An objection, according to the text,
“will ordinarily take the form of a reason as to why the accusation is wrong.”77
Although it will not contain evidence of innocence, the objection is designed to
shake the interrogator’s confidence in the suspect’s guilt.78 A suspect’s
willingness to resort to objections is a good thing, though, say Inbau et al.,
because “the suspect’s move from a denial to an objection is a good indication
of a concealment of the truth.”79 Substantively, the interrogator should “act as
though the statement was expected” (e.g., by saying “I was hoping you’d say
that” or “I’m glad you mentioned that”) and thereafter “reverse the significance
of the suspect’s objection and return to the interrogation theme without
delay.”80
Having instructed interrogators on how to handle denials and objections,
the Manual turns its attention, at step five, to teaching the interrogator how to
procure and retain the suspect’s attention.81 This step is particularly important
given the propensity of suspects “to psychologically withdraw from the
interrogation and ignore the investigator’s theme.”82 To avoid that result,
interrogators are advised to (1) move their chairs physically closer to the

74. Id. at 306.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 314–28.
77. Id. at 330. More specifically, an “objection” surpasses a mere denial by offering a brief explanation,
like “I couldn’t have done it,” “But I’ve got money in the bank,” or “I wouldn’t do a thing like that.” Id. at
333.
78. Id. at 331.
79. Id. (“An innocent suspect will usually remain steadfast with the denial alone and will feel no need to
embellish it at all.”).
80. Id. at 334–35. Reversing the significance of the suspect’s statement requires the interrogator to agree
with the suspect’s objection, while simultaneously pointing out the negative aspects were the objection
untruthful. Id. at 336. The text offers as an example the suspect’s denial of “that’s ridiculous . . . I don’t even
own a gun” in the context of a hypothetical armed robbery case. Id. at 336 tbl. 13-2. In response to the denial,
the interrogator might say something like:
I’m glad you mentioned that, Joe, because it tells me that it wasn’t your idea to do this; that one of
your buddies talked you into this, handed you the gun, and then the whole thing happened. You see,
Joe, if you did own a gun and carried it in that night, ready to use it, to kill somebody if they got in
your way, that’s one thing. But if the other guy stuck it in your hand, to use it just to scare
everybody that’s something else again . . . .
Id. (alteration in original).
81. Id. at 337–45.
82. Id. at 338.
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suspect,83 (2) establish eye contact,84 (3) use visual aids,85 or (4) ask
hypothetical questions.86
Step six then counsels interrogators on how to handle a suspect’s passive
mood.87 In short, this step first advises the interrogator to tailor the general
theme established at step two specifically to this suspect.88 If, after hearing this
theme restatement, the suspect “drifts into a passive mood,” then the
interrogator should move closer to the suspect and begin urging the suspect to
tell the truth.89 Working at the “peak of sincerity,” the investigator should
utilize “soft and warm”90 eye contact while speaking in a low tone and
encouraging the suspect to “tell the truth for the sake of his own conscience,
mental relief, or moral well-being, as well as ‘for the sake of everybody
concerned.’”91 The investigator should continue with this process “until the
suspect shows some physical sign of resignation, at which time step seven
should immediately be employed.”92
At step seven, the officer should present to the suspect a so-called
“alternative question,” which provides the suspect “a choice between two
explanations for possible commission of the crime.”93 One explanation is
designed to be more “acceptable” or “understandable” than the other.94 For
example, in a theft case, the interrogator may ask “[d]id you blow that money
on booze . . . or did you need it to help out your family?”95 The interrogator
should then follow with a statement supporting the more morally acceptable
alternative.96 Inbau et al. suggest that “the alternative question has allowed [the
suspect] the opportunity to tell the truth while saving face.”97
Once the suspect accepts his involvement in the crime based on a morally
understandable reason, step eight instructs the interrogator on how to deduce

83. Id. at 339.
84. Id. at 341.
85. Id. at 342.
86. Id. at 343.
87. Id. at 345–52.
88. Id. at 346.
89. Id. at 347.
90. Id. at 349.
91. Id. at 347.
92. Id. at 349.
93. Id. at 353.
94. Id. at 214.
95. Id. at 353. Alternatively, the interrogator might ask, “Joe, was this money used to take care of some
bills at home, or was it used to gamble?” Id. at 360.
96. Id. at 359. The alternative question might then be followed by a “negative supporting statement” like
“[y]ou don’t seem to be the kind of person who would do something like this in order to use it for gambling. If
you were that kind of person, I wouldn’t want to waste my time with you, but I don’t think you’re like that.”
Id. at 360. Or, the investigator might follow the alternative question with a “positive supporting statement”
such as, “I’m sure this money was for your family, for some bills at home. That’s something even an honest
person might do, if he was thinking of his family.” Id.
97. Id. at 353.
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details about the offense from the suspect.98 This step calls upon the
interrogator to “employ a great deal of patience”99 throughout several gradual
stages, beginning with offering the suspect a “statement of reinforcement.”100
The statement is a brief one like “[g]ood, that’s what I thought it was all
along,” which should be followed by working to develop the suspect’s gradual
acknowledgement of guilt.101 The interrogator should then “return to the
beginning of the crime and attempt to develop information that can be
corroborated by further investigation.”102 Finally, although only one
interrogator should elicit the initial oral confession,103 another person should
witness that oral confession once the first investigator “is satisfied that
adequate details surrounding the commission of the crime have been
obtained.”104
The ninth and final step counsels interrogators on how to convert the oral
confession into a written one.105 Step nine spans more than twenty pages of
text and, in doing so, (1) emphasizes the importance of documentation,106 (2)
teaches how to again provide the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona,107
(3) instructs how to prepare and form the confession,108 (4) outlines best
practices for safeguarding the effectiveness of the confession,109 and (5)
suggests engaging in a postconfession interview with the suspect.110

98. Id. at 365–74.
99. Id. at 365.
100. Id. at 366.
101. Id. at 366–69.
102. Id. at 369.
103. Id. at 371.
104. Id. at 372.
105. Id. at 374–97.
106. Id. at 375. According to the authors, documenting the confession is exceptionally important because
many suspects will later either deny that they confessed or claim that their confession was wrongfully induced.
Id. A written and signed confession not only limits controversy about the believability of the confession, but
also practically eliminates any argument about the existence of a confession. Id.
107. Id. at 376–77 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Before reducing the suspect’s
confession to writing, the authors suggest reading Miranda warnings to the suspect. Id. at 376. Particularly
where the suspect received warnings at the outset of interrogation, warnings should be repeated so as to
“mak[e] reference to the fact that the suspect had received and waived them earlier.” Id.
108. Id. at 377–89. Although confessions may take a narrative form, Inbau et al. recommend a questionand-answer format in the presence of a stenographer. Id. at 377–78. In this format, the interrogator should ask
the confessor, early in the confession, “a question that will call for an acknowledgement that he committed the
crime.” Id. at 379. Doing so is designed to enhance the “psychological effect on the jury when the written
confession is read”; indeed, say the authors, “[e]arly acknowledgment of guilt in a confession will serve to
arouse immediate interest in the document by the jury as it is read.” Id.
109. Id. at 389–91. Interrogators should, say the authors, preserve (1) stenographic notes, (2) notes about
the conditions under which the oral and written confessions were obtained, and (3) photographs or medical
examinations of the suspect. Id. at 389–90.
110. Id. at 391–93. Given the willingness of suspects to discuss the reasons why they confessed, Inbau et
al. suggest that a post-confession interview may present “an excellent opportunity for an investigator to
improve upon his knowledge and skill.” Id. at 391.
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II. Deconstructing the Reid Technique
With the impact of the Reid technique on the law enforcement
community and its asserted basis in psychology in mind, one might justifiably
wonder what backgrounds its creators possessed and how the Reid technique
grew to such prominent heights. The surprising answer, as this Part details, is
that there exists no basis in psychology to support the Reid technique. This
Part therefore seeks to wholly deconstruct the validity of the Reid method by
first briefly outlining in section A the backgrounds of its creators, John E. Reid
and Fred E. Inbau. Section B thereafter examines and dissects, in detail, the
historical rise of Inbau and Reid’s work.
A. Who Authored the Reid Technique?
The most recent edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions
credits four different authors: Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, Joseph P. Buckley,
and Brian C. Jayne.111 Given that Buckley and Jayne arrived on the historical
scene well after the Reid method’s original creation,112 uncovering the genesis
of the Reid method requires focusing almost exclusively on its original
creators: Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, respectively.113 This brief section
therefore offers a primer on their backgrounds.
1. Fred E. Inbau
Fred Edward Inbau was born on March 27, 1909, in New Orleans,
Louisiana, and received his B.S. from Tulane University in 1930.114 After
hearing from his father, a struggling shipyard worker, that lawyers make a

111. There is little information about the background of each author and, as a result, this section cobbles
together the meager biographical information available for each individual by relying, in large part, on their
scholarship.
112. Brian C. Jayne began working at John E. Reid and Associates in 1978. Fairfax County Criminal
Justice Academy Biographies, Brian C. Jayne (unpublished document, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
He graduated with a B.S. in Criminal Justice from the University of Wisconsin-Platteville and received a
“Master of Science in Detection of Deception” from the Reid College. Id. He also served as the Dean of Reid
College from 1983 to 1988. Id. A few perhaps obvious points about Jayne’s background bear mention. First,
there is no accredited college known as “Reid College.” See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Database of Accredited
Postsecondary Institutions and Programs, http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/Search.aspx (last visited Jan. 12,
2010) (search “Reid” under “Name of Institution”; no relevant results are produced). Second, this Author is
aware of no graduate school that awards a Master of Science degree in “detecting deception.”
Joseph P. Buckley is currently the president of John E. Reid & Associates. He received his B.A. from
Loyola University Chicago and he too holds a “Master of Science in Detection of Deception” from the Reid
College. See Encyclopedia of Security Management: Techniques and Technology, at xvi (John J. Fay ed., 2d
ed. 2007).
113. Naming the popular interrogation method as “the Reid technique” is somewhat ironic given that it
was Inbau who first developed the underlying interrogation techniques, see Inbau, supra note 6, whereas
Reid’s professional work focused almost exclusively on developing the polygraph method, see infra note 142
(providing list of Reid’s publications about the polygraph method for lie detection). Perhaps the irony is better
illustrated by the fact that it was Inbau who first coined the phrase “Reid technique,” and did so in reference to
Reid’s approach to polygraph examinations. See Fred E. Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 14
n.21 (2d ed. 1948).
114. Inbau Papers, supra note 24.
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significant amount of money,115 Inbau attended Tulane Law School where he
served as Editor-in-Chief of the Tulane Law Review and earned his LL.B. in
1932.116 Inbau then attended Northwestern University School of Law where he
received his LL.M., and began a lengthy professional relationship with the
School of Law.117
In 1933, Inbau began working as a research assistant in the Scientific
Crime Detection Laboratory, a permanent laboratory then associated with
Northwestern University School of Law.118 The lab focused on examining and
preserving criminal evidence through media like photography and chemical
analysis.119 It also offered practical experience in things like identifying
firearms, conducting polygraph tests, and detecting forgeries.120 Inbau’s
position thereafter became a joint one, requiring him to teach in the School of
Law and to work in the lab.121 Inbau met John E. Reid in 1940 when Reid
joined the lab that same year.122 Although the School of Law sold the lab in
1938, Inbau continued working there as its Director until 1941.123
From 1941 to 1945, Inbau returned to private practice as a trial attorney
until he rejoined Northwestern University School of Law as a full-time
professor of law.124 Inbau spent the balance of his career at the School of Law
where, among other things, he established continuing legal education courses
both for prosecuting and defense attorneys.125 He also served as president of
the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, worked as an editor for and
published in the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science,126

115. AELE Law Enforcement, Fred E. Inbau (1909–1998), http://www.aele.org/Inbau.html (last visited
Jan. 12, 2010).
116. Inbau Papers, supra note 24.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 5 (“The laboratory was established in 1929 after the St. Valentine’s
Day Massacre to give the police an edge in the fight against organized crime.”).
119. Inbau Papers, supra note 24.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 1.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science ran from 1951 to 1972 and
served to continue the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1931–1951). See Editorial, 42 J. Crim. L.
Criminology & Police Sci. 1 (1951) (recognizing the Journal’s 1951 name change). The 1931 to 1951 version
of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, in turn, continued Dean Henry Wigmore’s original Journal
of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology (1910–1931). See Editorials, Announcement, 22
Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 3 (1931) (recognizing the Journal’s 1931 name change). A 1973 change
divided the Journal into The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973–present) and a new periodical
called the Journal of Police Science and Administration. See Editorial, 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1973).
Northwestern published all iterations of the Journal, regardless of timeframe. To avoid confusion, the text of
this Article treats all versions of the Journal as though they were published in the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology.
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and established a nonprofit organization called Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement.127
Inbau’s work earned him credit for replacing the “third degree” method of
interrogation in the early 1900s with “an approach to interrogation that relied
on presenting a mass of damaging facts to persuade criminals that they had no
choice but to confess, and that used subtle psychology in dealing with crimes
of passion.”128 No matter the crime, though, Inbau’s interrogation methods
relied on sympathy for the criminal, trickery, deception, and sometimes
outright lies.129 To determine which of his methods was most effective, Inbau
often interviewed prisoners after their conviction.130
Inbau shared his expertise through his work as a prolific scholar both
during his tenure at the School of Law and after his retirement from it in
1977.131 His impressive resume of publications includes more than forty-five
journal articles and eighteen books,132 the first of which was Lie Detection and
Criminal Interrogation in 1942.133 And, as his friendship with Reid grew, the
pair began working together and collaborated on several texts, including Truth
and Deception: The Polygraph (“Lie-Detector”) Technique134 and, most
notably for the purposes of this Article, the multiple, influential editions of
Criminal Interrogations and Confessions.135 Inbau died in May of 1998 from
injuries he sustained in a traffic accident.136

127. AELE Law Enforcement, Fred E. Inbau (1909–1998), supra note 115. Inbau established the
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE) in order to counteract the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by filing amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court cases involving
restrictions on police actions. See Inbau Papers, supra note 24, at 2.
Inbau also served as an officer and director of the Chicago Crime Commission and president of the
Illinois Academy of Criminology (1951–1952) and of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (1955–
1956). Id. And, in addition to his founding of AELE, Inbau founded the Business Integrity Institute in order to
lobby against laws restricting employers’ ability to terminate employees at will. Id.
128. Thomas, supra note 5.
129. Id. Inbau was considered a “master” at using his own techniques:
When questioning a man suspected of killing his wife, for example, Mr. Inbau would feign such
sympathy for the hapless man’s plight, sometimes shedding real tears, and showing such contempt
for the bullying wife who had driven him to the deed that by the time the man broke down and
confessed, his main regret would be that he had not killed the woman sooner.
Id.
130. Id.
131. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Commemorative Note on Professor Fred Inbau, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
176, 176 (1977) (commemorating Inbau’s retirement).
132. See Thomas, supra note 5; Biographical Sketch—Fred E. Inbau, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, at ix–
xi (1977) (appearing in the Table of Contents).
133. Inbau, supra note 6.
134. John E. Reid & Fred E. Inbau, Truth and Deception: The Polygraph (“Lie-Detector”) Technique
(1966).
135. Supra note 132.
136. Note from the Editors, Tribute to Fred E. Inbau, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1269, 1269 (1999)
(noting the date of death); Inbau et al., supra note 3, at ix (noting the cause of death).
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2. John E. Reid
Materials providing biographical information for John E. Reid are scarce,
to say the least. He was born on August 16, 1910, and obtained a law degree
from DePaul University.137 He joined the Chicago Police Department in 1936
and later accepted a position in the Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection
Laboratory where, as noted, he met Fred Inbau.138 He was trained at the lab as
a polygraph examiner and remained there until 1947 when he left to begin his
own company, John E. Reid & Associates.139
Reid thereafter dedicated his professional life to the polygraph
examination.140 He testified as a polygraph expert in numerous cases
nationwide.141 And, as discussed in detail below, Reid also published several
articles in Inbau’s Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,142 as well as
coauthoring numerous texts with him.143 Of particular interest, of course, he
137. John E. Reid & Assocs., Inc., Seminar Schedule & Product Catalog 2 (2009).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 178 (Mich. 1977) (noting that Reid had been involved with
the polygraph for over thirty years).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Zeiger, 350
F. Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Barbara, 255
N.W.2d at 178; see also People v. Styles, 220 N.E.2d 885, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (noting Reid’s testimony
reporting the results of his interrogation of defendant).
142. See, e.g., Frank S. Horvath & John E. Reid, The Polygraph Silent Answer Test, 63 J. Crim. L.
Criminology & Police Sci. 285 (1972) [hereinafter Horvath & Reid, Polygraph Silent Answer Test]; Frank S.
Horvath & John E. Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J.
Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 276 (1971) [hereinafter Horvath & Reid, Reliability of Polygraph
Examiner Diagnosis]; George W. Harman & John E. Reid, The Selection and Phrasing of Lie-Detector Test
Control Questions, 46 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 578 (1955) [hereinafter Warman & Reid,
Selection and Phrasing of Lie-Detector Questions]; Richard O. Arther & John E. Reid, Utilizing the Lie
Detector Technique to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police
Sci. 213 (1954) [hereinafter Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in Paternity Cases]; John E. Reid & Richard O.
Arther, Behavior Symptoms of Lie-Detector Subjects, 44 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 104 (1953)
[hereinafter Reid & Arther, Behavior Symptoms]; John E. Reid, A Revised Questioning Technique in LieDetection Tests, 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 542 (1947) [hereinafter Reid, Revised Questioning Technique];
John E. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses in Lie-Detector Tests and a Method for Their Detection, 36
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 201 (1945) [hereinafter Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses]; John E. Reid,
Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes, 34 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 69 (1943) [hereinafter Reid, Police
Science 1943]; John E. Reid, Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes, 33 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 97
(1942) [hereinafter Reid, Police Science 1942]; John E. Reid, Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes, 32 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 259 (1941) [hereinafter Reid, Police Science 1941]. Reid also published a handful of
articles in other journals. See, e.g., Fred E. Inbau & John E. Reid, The Lie-Detector Technique: A Reliable and
Valuable Investigative Aid, 50 A.B.A. J. 470 (1964) [hereinafter Inbau & Reid, Lie-Detector Technique:
Reliable and Valuable]; John E. Reid, The Lie Detector in Court, 4 DePaul L. Rev. 31 (1954); John E. Reid,
The Lie-Detector, 15 Ins. Couns. J. 85 (1948).
143. See, e.g., Inbau et al., supra note 3; Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid & Joseph P. Buckley, Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, at v (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Inbau, Reid & Buckley, Criminal Interrogation
3d ed.] (Although he died in 1982, Reid participated in authoring some of the manuscript for this third
edition.); John E. Reid & Fred E. Inbau, Truth and Deception: The Polygraph (“Lie-Detector”) Technique (2d
ed. 1977) [hereinafter Reid & Inbau, Truth and Deception 2d ed.] Fred E. Inbau & John E. Reid, Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation 2d ed.]; Reid &
Inbau, supra note 134; Inbau & Reid, supra note 20; Fred E. Inbau & John E. Reid, Lie Detection and
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coauthored with Inbau the 1953 edition of Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogation, and the 1962, 1967, and 1986 editions of Criminal Interrogation
and Confessions.144 Reid died from cardiovascular illness on January 11,
1982.145
B. How Were Two LAWYERS Able to Create Legitimate Interrogation
Techniques Premised on PSYCHOLOGY? (Hint: They Were Not)
For an impressive and astonishing sixty-seven years, the work of two
individuals with merely law degrees has entered nearly every interrogation
room.146 But how did they do it? How did Reid and Inbau—neither of whom
had a background in psychology—become the two most noted resources for
establishing psychological methods for obtaining confessions? To answer these
questions, this section examines salient portions of their scholarship in detail
while periodically considering the social climate at the time of publication.
As with all great stories, it began with good timing. At the time Inbau
published his first text on interrogation in 1942, law enforcement’s use of the
“third degree” had grown so unpopular that nobody bothered to ask whether
Inbau could authoritatively introduce psychology into the interrogation
room.147 Before that text, interrogators relied on harsh physically abusive
tactics to obtain confessions and even the Supreme Court struggled to evaluate
their validity. How did the Court struggle and why did it need Fred Inbau, you
ask? Let us briefly digress to find the answers.
The Supreme Court has long recognized—since 1884, to be exact—that
“[a] confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most
satisfactory character.”148 At first, the requirement that a confession be made
voluntarily was construed narrowly as merely a common-law evidentiary
requirement having no relationship to the Constitution.149 Yet, in that context,
an involuntary confession was one induced by a “threat or promise by or in the
presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the
accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will or
self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of

Criminal Interrogation (3d ed. 1953) [hereinafter Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 3d
ed.].
144. See supra note 143 (providing list of coauthored titles).
145. Inbau, Reid & Buckley, Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143.
146. See generally Weisselberg, supra note 22, at 1537 (“Whether or not the surveyed officers recognized
the Reid name, they employed many of the same techniques.”).
147. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940); see also Leo, supra note 4, at 80 (“What is
sociologically significant about the interrogation training manuals and seminars is not that they are founded on
pseudo-scientific knowledge, but rather that Inbau, Reid and others have articulated and disseminated a
professional ideology of interrogation that has sought to confer legitimacy on controversial police practices by
invoking the cultural authority of modern science and technology.”).
148. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884).
149. Id. at 584–85.
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the law.”150 The Court subsequently applied this early voluntariness rule to a
number of cases in which the defendant was in custody, yet received no
warnings about silence or counsel.151
Thirteen years later, in Bram v. United States, the Court merged its
common law voluntariness rule into the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.152 The “generic” language of the Fifth Amendment, the
Court reasoned, “was but a crystallization of the doctrine as to confessions.”153
Although, after Bram, involuntary confessions were inadmissible in federal
criminal trials as a matter of constitutional law, the Fifth Amendment was not
yet considered a fundamental right applicable to the states.154 States were
therefore free to ignore the Bram voluntariness requirement.
For roughly three decades thereafter, federal courts faithfully applied
Bram,155 a proposition aided by the Supreme Court’s extension of Bram in
Ziang Sung Wan v. United States.156 In Wan, an ill defendant confessed after
enduring almost two weeks of relentless, incommunicado police
interrogation.157 Although the defendant’s resulting confession was motivated
neither by threat nor promise, the Court nonetheless held that “a confession
obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been the
character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was applied in a
judicial proceeding or otherwise.”158
Notwithstanding the extension of Bram in Wan, there remained no
constitutional basis for excluding a defendant’s confession in state court until
1936.159 In Brown v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court—adhering to principles of
federalism160—held that due process mandated invalidating a confession
obtained by “officers of the State [using] brutality and violence.”161
150. Id. at 585.
151. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355,
357 (1896); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895).
152. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
153. Id. at 543.
154. See infra note 160 (discussing incorporation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
155. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir. 1929); Purpura v. United States, 262 F.
473, 476 (4th Cir. 1919); Sorenson v. United States, 143 F. 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1906).
156. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
157. Id. at 10–14.
158. Id. at 14–15.
159. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936). This was of course of particular significance
given that the Court had yet to hold that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applied to the states.
160. Given the holding in Bram, it would seem reasonable for the Court to ground its holding in the Fifth
Amendment. Yet, at that time, the Court had previously held on several occasions that the Fifth Amendment
did not apply to the states. See, e.g., Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 322 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98 (1908). That precedent was, however,
overruled in 1964 by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964), when the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporated” the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
161. 297 U.S. at 279, 286. Interestingly, Brown was one of many confession decisions issued by the
Supreme Court between the 1930s and 1940s disapproving of conduct by southern white interrogators
questioning African American defendants. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942); Vernon v.
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Specifically, in Brown, officers (with the aid of an angry mob) hanged one and
severely whipped three “ignorant negroes” until the trio confessed to
committing a murder.162 After analogizing the state’s conduct to “the rack and
torture chamber,”163 the Court had little trouble concluding that “[i]t would be
difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than
those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear
denial of due process.”164
What remained missing after Brown, however, was any meaningful
insight into how to distinguish a voluntary confession from an involuntary one.
Indeed, given that the facts in Brown so clearly mandated discarding the
defendants’ confessions, the Court had no occasion to offer any guidance to
courts in future, closer cases. Yet, before leaving Brown, it is worth pausing to
highlight what would grow into a thematic concern of the Supreme Court: the
conduct of police during interrogation and, more specifically, the use of
violence in the interrogation room to procure a confession.165
The litany of post-Brown confession cases decided by the Court in the
1940s,166 particularly those evaluating the propriety of state confessions, was
arguably spurred on by the 1931 Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement,
otherwise known as “the Wickersham Report.”167 The Wickersham Report
exposed the use of “third degree” tactics (i.e., the use of physical or mental
pain to extract a confession or statement from a suspect).168 The report
specifically documented, among other techniques, the use of hot lights, beating
suspects with fists or phone books, and confinement in putrid rooms.169 It
likewise expressed concern over the use of psychologically coercive tactics
like prolonged questioning in isolation without providing food or sleep to the
suspect.170

Alabama, 313 U.S. 547, 547 (1941) (mem.); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544, 544 (1941) (mem.); Canty v.
Alabama, 309 U.S. 629, 629 (1940) (mem.) White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532–33 (1940); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238–42 (1940).
162. 297 U.S. at 281–83.
163. Id. at 285–86.
164. Id. at 286.
165. See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 11 (1924) (describing the government’s
interrogation as “severe” and “excruciating”); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897) (reaffirming
concern about police “temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to
push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions” (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
596 (1896))).
166. See e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Vernon,
313 U.S. 547; Lomax, 313 U.S. 544; Canty, 309 U.S. 629; White, 309 U.S. 631; Chambers, 309 U.S. 227.
167. See Wickersham Report, supra note 4.
168. Id. at 19.
169. Id. at 31, 47, 126, 149.
170. Id. at 118, 191–205.
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Although the Court would refer to the Wickersham Report in several
subsequent cases,171 it first did so in Chambers v. Florida.172 Relying on
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, the Court invalidated state confessions
taken in 1933 from four young African American defendants convicted of
murdering an elderly white man.173 The Court again relied on the Report when
echoing its condemnation of the “third degree” interrogation tactics in Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, wherein the Court invalidated, on the basis of Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process, uncorroborated 1941 state confessions taken from
two suspects convicted of murder.174
When it became clear that “third degree” interrogation tactics would no
longer be tolerated, police began exerting psychological pressures on the
suspect.175 Enter Fred Inbau and his influential 1942 publication, Lie Detection
and Criminal Interrogation.176 He divided the book into two parts: the first on
the polygraph and the other on methods for—and law governing177—criminal
interrogations.178 In the first part, focusing on the polygraph, Inbau outlined,
inter alia, the device’s history179 and its utility,180 and contends that it in no
way represents a continuation of “third degree” practices.181 Ironically, Inbau
also opined on what credentials a polygraph examiner should possess.182
Although strongly arguing for the polygraph’s utility, Inbau conceded that “a
period of skillful interrogation after the completion of the [polygraph] tests is
usually required before a confession is forthcoming.”183
171. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 & n.5 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 572–76 (1961); Haley, 332 U.S. at 605–06 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 201–02 & n.* (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 150 nn.5–6, 152 n.8.
172. 309 U.S. 227, 238 n.11 (1940).
173. Id. at 238–42.
174. 322 U.S. at 154. The petitioners in Ashcraft were questioned in secret for thirty-six straight hours,
after which petitioner Ashcraft gave an equivocal confession that he refused to sign once police transcribed it.
Id. at 151–54.
175. Miranda, 384 U.S.at 445–48 (reviewing the history of interrogation techniques and emphasizing,
post-Chambers, that “the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically
oriented”).
176. Inbau, supra note 6.
177. The section on the law would draw Professor Kamisar’s ire two decades later for its incompleteness.
See Yale Kamisar, What Is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 728, 735 (1963) (commenting on the 1953 edition’s law
section and noting “that anyone who attempts to set forth and analyze ‘the law’ on these subjects in 62 pages—
which is all the space the authors take—strives for the near impossible”).
178. Inbau, supra note 6, at vii. Notably, Inbau also pauses to thank Reid in the preface. Id. at vi (“For
their valuable comments on the manuscript, I am indebted to . . . John E. Reid.”).
179. Id. at 2–4.
180. Id. at 54–58.
181. Id. at 68 (“The temporary discomfort produced by the blood pressure cuff is too slight to warrant
objection, and the test procedure is of such a nature that it is extremely improbable that it would encourage or
compel a person to confess to a crime which he did not commit.”).
182. Id. at 58–59. According to Inbau, a polygraph operator “should have a fair understanding of
psychology and physiology—and preferably an extensive knowledge of each—but it is not necessary that he
be either a physician or an expert psychologist.” Id. at 58.
183. Id.
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In the section on interrogation, Inbau outlined nineteen interrogation
tactics—premised only on his criminal case experiences184—and assigned a
letter of the alphabet to each tactic.185 Although otherwise relatively
unorganized, Inbau recommended using techniques A through I on “emotional
offenders”186 and techniques J through N on “non-emotional offenders.”187
Notably, none of the proffered techniques—many of which are still taught
unchanged today188—recommended that police rely on physical violence to
obtain a confession.189
For emotional offenders—i.e., those whose offenses produce in them a
feeling of remorse—Inbau recommended the following techniques: (A) display
an air of confidence in the subject’s guilt; (B) point out the circumstantial
evidence indicative of guilt; (C) call attention to the subject’s physiological
and psychological “symptoms” of guilt; (D) sympathize with the subject by
telling him that anyone else under similar conditions or circumstances might
have committed a similar offense; (E) reduce a subject’s guilt feeling by
minimizing the moral seriousness of his offense; (F) sympathize with the
subject by condemning his victim, or his accomplice, or anyone else upon
whom some degree of responsibility might conceivably be placed for the
commission of the crime in question; (G) express friendship in urging the
subject to tell the truth; (H) indicate to the subject, as a reason for telling the
truth, the possibility of exaggeration on the part of his accusers; and (I) rather
than seek a general admission of guilt, first ask the subject a question as to
some detail pertaining to the offense.190
For nonemotional offenders—i.e., those who experience little or no
feeling of remorse—Inbau recommended these techniques: (J) point out the
futility of resistance; (K) appeal to the subject’s pride by well-selected flattery,
or by a challenge to his honor; (L) point out to the subject the grave
consequences and futility of a continuation of his offensive behavior; (M)
where unsuccessful in obtaining a confession to the offense in question, seek
an admission about some other minor offense; and (N) play one co-offender
against the other when possible.191
Finally, Inbau recommended five additional interrogation techniques for
emotional and nonemotional offenders alike when guilt is uncertain: (O) ask
the subject if he knows why he is being questioned; (P) obtain from the subject

184. Id. at vi (“It was upon the basis of the actual criminal case experiences of the writer and his former
colleagues that these various tactics and techniques were formulated.”).
185. Id. at 81–118.
186. Id. at 80.
187. Id. at 97.
188. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
189. Leo, supra note 4, at 63 (“[Reid and Inbau’s] seemingly well-intentioned training materials appear to
be at least partially responsible for the decline of third degree practices by American police in the 1940s and
1950s.”).
190. Inbau, supra note 6, at 81–95.
191. Id. at 97–104.
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detailed information about his whereabouts before, during, and after the crime;
(Q) ask the subject to relate all he knows about the offense, the victim, and
other possible suspects; (R) where certain facts are known that suggest the
subject’s guilt, ask him about them casually and as though the real facts were
not already known; and (S) at various intervals ask the subject certain pertinent
questions as though the interrogator already knows the correct answers.192
Given how many of these techniques appear in the current 2001 edition of
Criminal Interrogation & Confessions,193 it is remarkable how little has
changed in the approach to interrogation tactics since 1942.
In any event, after successfully quenching the judiciary’s thirst for new
interrogation methods by publishing Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation
in 1942,194 Inbau rejoined Northwestern School of Law as a faculty member in
1945.195 Having Inbau at Northwestern likely helped Reid to establish his own
research on the polygraph. As Inbau grew fascinated with, and became
persuaded by, Reid’s polygraph work,196 Reid’s research gradually began to
emerge in the Northwestern University Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology. With a name like Northwestern attached to Reid’s publications
and only a J.D. to support his “scientific” research, only winning the lottery
could have offered Reid better luck.

192. Id. at 104–18.
193. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
194. Leo, supra note 4, at 63. (“[Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation] was a reformist document,
representing a kind of dialectical synthesis between the polarities of third degree violence and civil liberties for
protection of human dignity: Such a synthesis would have been progressive in the 1930s.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1 Crim. Just. Ethics 40, 47 (1982))).
195. Biographical Sketch—Fred E. Inbau, supra note 132.
196. Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143, at vii. In the preface
to the third edition of Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation, Inbau credits Reid with developing a new
“control question” lie-detector test procedure. Id. Based on this new “development,” Inbau “invited [his] good
friend and former colleague, John E. Reid, to join [Inbau] as coauthor, for it was his research and
experimentation that effected this advancement in the lie-detector technique.” Id.
Significantly, the control question technique is hardly foreign to most polygraph examiners. See
Shauna Fleming Askins, United States v. Scheffer: An Anomaly in the Military or a Return to the Per Se Ban
on Polygraph Evidence?, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 175, 181 (2000) (“The Control-Question Test (CQT) is the most
commonly administered polygraph test.”). Indeed, even the Department of Defense has relied on the
technique. See Mark D. Maxwell et al., Recent Developments Concerning the Constitutionality of Military
Rule of Evidence 707, Army L., Dec. 1994, at 13, 14. Briefly stated, the control question technique involves
the following procedure:
This technique involves the formulation of ten to twelve questions to elicit “yes” or “no” responses.
In a [control question] polygraph, examiners ask irrelevant, relevant, and control questions.
Irrelevant questions obtain a subject’s normal truthful reactions and chart tracings. Relevant
questions concern the matter under investigation. Control questions deal with “an act of
wrongdoing of the same general nature as the one [sic] under investigation.”
Id. (quoting Paul C. Giannelli & Edward I. Imwinkelreid, 1 Sci. Evidence 65, 221 (1993) (quoting Reid &
Inbau, Truth and Deception 2d ed., supra note 143, at 28)).
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Reid’s work on the Journal began slowly when, from 1942 to 1944, he
wrote annual legal abstracts that summarized various evidentiary issues.197
Then, in 1946—the year after Inbau rejoined Northwestern’s law faculty and
became Northwestern’s Managing Director of Journals198—Reid wrote his first
article in the Journal titled Simulated Blood Pressure Responses in LieDetector Tests and a Method for Their Detection.199 In the first footnote—one
usually earmarked for the author to provide his or her credentials200—Reid
declined to note his own credentials and, instead, dutifully thanked Inbau.201
That thirteen-page article, supported by a mere seven footnotes (several of
which were unaccompanied by citations),202 reported Reid’s experiments with
a lie-detection device he created to perceive deceptive responses from
suspects.203 Buried among unsupported claims like “[l]ie-detector tests have
been compared to clinical examinations wherein similar physiological
phenomena are recorded,” Reid concludes that his new device would enable
examiners to “separat[e] the true patterns of deception from the fraudulent
ones.”204 Given that Reid used himself to conduct the “experiments” in support
of his conclusion,205 Science Magazine was likely not eager to solicit his
findings for publication.206

197. Reid, Police Science 1943, supra note 142; Reid, Police Science 1942, supra note 142; Reid, Police
Science 1941, supra note 142. Although Inbau was not yet part of the School of Law faculty, his role as an
Associate Editor on the Journal presumably helped Reid earn these brief placements. See, e.g., Masthead, 35 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1944) (listing Inbau as an Associate Editor and noting his professional role as
“Counsellor at Law, Chicago”); Masthead, 34 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1943) (same); Masthead, 33 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1942) (same). Inbau would later serve as Editor-in-Chief for the Journal from
1965 to 1971. Foreword to Biographical Sketch—Fred E. Inbau, supra note 132. Inbau stepped down from
serving as Editor-in-Chief in 1971 so that the Journal could grow into a student-run publication. See id.; James
A. Rahl, Fred E. Inbau: Professorial Fighter of Crime, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 175, 175 (1977).
198. Masthead, 36 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 2 (1945) (listing Inbau as the “Managing Director of
Journals”).
199. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142.
200. See generally Eugene Volokh, Writing a Student Article, 48 J. Legal Educ. 247, 267 (1998) (referring
to the first footnote as an “author’s note”).
201. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142, at 201 n.* (“The writer is indebted to
Professor Fred E. Inbau of Northwestern University . . . .”).
202. See generally Richard Delgado, How to Write a Law Review Article, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 445, 451
(1986) (“Essentially, each assertion of law or fact that you make in the body of your article will require a
footnote.”).
203. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142, at 211 & fig.11 (providing an illustration
of the device). More specifically, Reid was fundamentally concerned with the possibility of suspects
influencing the results of their lie-detector tests by increasing or decreasing their blood pressure or body
movements in response to certain questions. Id. at 208. Reid’s new device was designed to detect and
eliminate the assertion of artificial blood pressure responses, thereby increasing the possibility of accurately
determining whether a suspect proffered deceptive responses. Id. at 211–14.
204. Id. at 214.
205. Id. at 203–07. Reid assures the reader “that in these various experiments the writer used his full
power of concentration to simulate guilt reactions without being burdened with the guilt complexes of an
actual criminal suspect.” Id. at 207.
206. See Science Magazine: General Information for Authors, http://www.sciencemag.org/about/
authors/prep/gen_info.dtl#unpublished (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (outlining article submission requirements
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Reid continued his work in the Journal one year later when he published
A Revised Questioning Technique in Lie-Detection Tests.207 An Editor’s note at
the outset of the article stated the following:
The author of this article, a member of the staff of the Chicago Police
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, has had extensive experience in liedetection examination of criminal suspects and witnesses. He has made two
noteworthy contributions to the field of scientific lie detection, the first of
which was described in a previous number of this Journal. See “Simulated
Blood Pressure Responses in Lie-Detection Tests and a Method for Their
Detection,” 36 (3):201 (1945). The present paper describes Mr. Reid’s
second and equally important contribution.208

Reid correspondingly offered his thanks to Inbau in the article’s first
footnote.209 In this five-page article, unsupported by a single substantive
footnote,210 Reid argues in favor of questioning suspects undergoing polygraph
examination using a “comparative response” method.211 Ordinarily, Reid
indicates, “[t]he customary lie-detector questioning technique involves asking
a number of pertinent questions along with several which are irrelevant to the
matter under investigation but which are asked for the purpose of determining
the nature of the subject’s reactions to the test situation alone.”212 The
comparative response method, however, involves the use of a question “which
the examiner knows or feels reasonably sure the subject will lie about” in order
to “indicate the subject’s responsiveness when lying.”213
Reid based his contention that “comparative response” questioning is
superior to “conventional” questioning on additional unspecified
“experiments” he performed with his colleagues at the Chicago Police
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory.214 Apart from the quite apparent

and cautioning, “[c]itations to unpublished data and personal communications cannot be used to support claims
in a published paper”); see also Julie Bosman, Reporters Find Science Journals Harder to Trust, but Not Easy
to
Verify,
N.Y.
Times,
Feb.
13,
2006,
at
c1,
available
at
http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/13/business/media/13journal.html (“Among the most prestigious science journals
that reporters consult regularly are Nature, Science, The New England Journal of Medicine and The Journal of
the American Medical Association.”). Notably, Science Magazine was first published in 1883 and thus was in
circulation at the time of Reid and Inbau’s publications. See About AAAS, History & Archives,
http://archives.aaas.org/exhibit/origins4.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
207. Reid, Revised Questioning Technique, supra note 142.
208. Id. at 542.
209. Id. at 542 n.* (“The writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance of . . . Fred E. Inbau, Professor of
Law at Northwestern University . . . for his advice and assistance in the organization and preparation of this
paper . . . .”). Inbau was serving as Managing Director of the Northwestern journals at the time of Reid’s
second publication and therefore presumably had at least some role in crafting the Editor’s note quoted in the
above text. See Fred E. Inbau, Change in Journal Editorship, 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 540, 541 (1947)
(noting his role as Managing Director).
210. The article has three footnotes, none of which contain citations to supporting experimental data. See
Reid, Revised Questioning Technique, supra note 142, at 542 n.1, 546 n.2, 547 n.3.
211. Id. at 544–45.
212. Id. at 542.
213. Id. at 544.
214. Id. at 542, 546–47.
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absence of an empirical basis to support Reid’s thesis, the formula used for his
emerging prominence is becoming clear: witness the use of an interesting
device (a lie-detector device);215 ostensibly improve upon its use; write articles
about those improvements; and make friends with a prominent law professor in
order to publish those articles in his well-respected legal journal. Although
Reid (presumably subconsciously) would refine that formula in later years, he
already had a firm foundation for his house of cards in 1947.
Reid, of course, was not alone in this endeavor. In 1948, Inbau published
his second iteration of Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation.216 That text,
like its 1942 predecessor, is divided into two sections: one on the lie detector
technique and the other on criminal interrogation tactics.217 Although, from a
substantive standpoint, little changed between the two editions, Inbau did
reprint both of Reid’s essays on the lie-detector and credited the techniques
espoused in them with providing “several distinct advantages over the
procedure previously used.”218 In doing so, Inbau appeared to pass the
proverbial torch to Reid for all things related to “the field of deception
detection.”219 Indeed, in addition to crediting Reid’s approach to polygraph
examination, Inbau also indicated his retirement from the field of deception
detection in 1941.220
Reid’s approach to polygraph examination ultimately so influenced Inbau
that Inbau invited Reid to coauthor the third edition of Lie Detection and
Criminal Interrogation, published in 1953.221 Like the two editions before it,
the third edition remained separated into two sections: one addressed the liedetector technique and the other dealt with criminal interrogation.222 In this
edition’s preface, however, Inbau indicated that part one—addressing the liedetector technique—was wholly the product of Reid’s “research and

215. Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, supra note 142, at 202 fig.1 (noting Reid’s use of a
“modified pre-1939 model of the Keeler Polygraph” during his work at the Chicago Police Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory).
216. Inbau, supra note 113.
217. Id. at xi (Table of Contents).
218. Id. at 14; see also id. at vii–viii (“I am also greatly indebted to [Reid] for permission to include in the
present publication a reprinting of his excellent article ‘Simulated Blood Pressure Responses in Lie-Detector
Tests and a Method for their Detection,’ together with portions of his paper on ‘A Revised Questioning
Technique in Lie Detection Tests,’ both of which contributions originally appeared in the American Journal of
Police Science (incorporated in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).”). Inbau continued to organize
his comments on criminal interrogation in something of a scattershot manner by adhering to the alphabet
structure he provided in the first edition. See id. at 107–38. Thus, although the revised text noted, for example,
the Supreme Court’s decisions in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), United States v. Mitchell,
322 U.S. 65 (1944), and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), he continued to provide nineteen
interrogation pointers organized from the letters A through S premised solely on his observations. See Inbau,
supra note 113, at 151–52 nn.3–6, 162–69, 107–38.
219. Inbau, supra note 113, at 14.
220. Id.
221. Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143.
222. Id. at xi (Table of Contents).
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experimentation.”223 Other than discussing a relatively small flurry of Supreme
Court confession cases decided since 1948,224 part two remained largely
unchanged from the prior two editions.225
Reid continued his push for fame when, in 1954, he coauthored Behavior
Symptoms of Lie-Detector Subjects with Richard O. Arther and again published
in the Journal.226 Like Reid’s prior efforts, this piece was brief—four pages—
and supported only by the authors’ assertions.227 In it, the pair reported the
results of a five-year “study”—based solely on the authors’ observations228—
purporting to reflect what behavioral symptoms guilty persons exhibit.229
Although the authors recognize that no specific type of behavior “should ever
be considered proof of guilt or innocence,” the results of their study were
nevertheless designed to aid lie-detector examiners in “consider[ing] the
probable significance of a subject’s behavior pattern.”230
According to the authors, guilty subjects, inter alia (1) “frequently attempt
to postpone the date for their examination,” (2) “look[] very worried and [are]
highly nervous,” (3) “feel it necessary to explain before the examination why
their responses might mislead the examiner into believing that they are lying,”
and (4) “sometimes claim that the apparatus is causing them physical pain.”231
The study also showed, according to Reid and Arther, that guilty subjects often
sought to distort the results by, for example, wiggling their toes, coughing, or
changing their breathing rate.232
In contrast, innocent subjects often eagerly approached the prospect of a
lie-detector test because they were “usually very glad to be given an
opportunity to prove their innocence.”233 Then, during the exam, “[i]nnocent
subjects are often at ease, light-hearted, and talkative.”234 From this
information, the authors conclude, “[a] definite advantage can be gained from

223. Id. at vii.
224. Id. at 205–07 (discussing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950) (per
curiam); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)).
225. Again, part two set forth Inbau’s comments about how to effectively interrogate suspects over the
course of nineteen separate points spanning assigned letters from A through S. See Inbau & Reid, Lie
Detection and Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143, at 153–85.
226. Reid & Arther, Behavior Symptoms, supra note 142. The addition of Arther to the byline should have
done little to aid Reid in his quest for legitimacy. Arther held a B.S. in Police Administration and no additional
academic credentials other than his pursuing “the study of scientific lie detection at John E. Reid and
Associates for six months.” Id. at 104.
227. The article is not accompanied by footnotes or supporting experimental data. See id. at 104–08.
228. Id. at 104 (“During this time the behavior reactions and statements of these subjects were closely
observed and immediately written into the case file.”).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 105.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 106.
234. Id.
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observing and classifying a subject’s behavior symptoms.”235 Although the
disturbing absence of empirical support for the authors’ conclusions should
have nullified the article’s impact, it was nevertheless reprinted in the third
edition of Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation.236
Arther and Reid emerged in the Journal yet again just one year later in
1955, when the pair published Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to
Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases.237 This article, like those
before it, is brief and is accompanied by little supporting data.238 The authors
argue for the utility of forcing fathers who disavow paternity to take liedetector tests.239 Doing so, they contend, will more efficiently resolve the
cases, particularly where the court does not “have at its disposal the facilities
for having blood-grouping tests made of the complainant, the defendant, and
the child.”240 Even if the court does have access to such tests, the authors
reason, the tests only exclude the individual but cannot identify the father.241
To aid their assertions, the authors state the following without citation support:
The latest estimation accords to the lie-detector technique, when properly
used, an accuracy of 95%, with a 4% margin of indefinite (inconclusive)
determinations and a 1% margin of maximum possible error. In other words,
in the examination of 100 subjects the examiner can make a definite and
accurate diagnosis as to the guilt or innocence of 95 of these subjects. The
actual known error at the Reid laboratories for the past six years was less
than .0007.242

235. See id. at 107.
236. Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143, at 106–10.
237. Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in Paternity Cases, supra note 142.
238. This paper is eight pages and has eight footnotes. In the course of those eight footnotes, the authors
rely on a total of three sources—one of which is the third edition of Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation.
See id. at 214 n.2, 216 n.5. The article also lacks supporting scientific data. See id. The authors instead rely on
a six-year “study” conducted at John E. Reid & Associates, during which the authors administered polygraph
tests in 312 disputed paternity cases. See id. at 214–15. From that study, “it was determined that 93 percent of
the tested parties lied in some respect when they testified in court as to their sexual relationship!” Id. at 215.
239. Id. at 219.
240. Id. at 214.
241. Id. at 219.
242. Id. at 216 n.5; accord Reid & Inbau, supra note 134, at 234 (arguing that the percentage of known
polygraph exam errors is below one percent). But see Paul C. Gianelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49
Hastings L.J. 895, 919 (1998) (“This error rate is suspect because it is based on the assumption that polygraph
results are correct unless proven otherwise.”). An inordinate number of studies contradict this (again
unsupported) assertion of accuracy. See, e.g., Gordon H. Barland & David C. Raskin, An Evaluation of Field
Techniques in Detection of Deception, 12 Psychophysiology 321 (1976); Frank Horvath, The Effect of Selected
Variables on Interpretation of Polygraph Records, 62 J. Applied Psychol. 127, 130–31 (1977); Benjamin
Kleinmuntz & Julian J. Szucko, On the Fallibility of Lie Detection, 17 Law & Soc’y Rev. 85, 95–96 (1982)
(finding that a leading polygraph firm incorrectly characterized thirty-nine percent of verified innocent
examinees as guilty); see also, e.g., U.S. Cong. Office of Tech., Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph
Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation 97 (1983) (noting polygraph studies that showed accuracy rates of
approximately sixty percent); Douglas Carroll, How Accurate Is Polygraph Lie Detection?, in The Polygraph
Test: Lies, Truth and Science 19, 22 (Anthony Gale ed., 1988) (highlighting lab results demonstrating a
twenty-three percent chance that an innocent person will be classified as guilty); Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra,
at 87 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that lying produces distinctive physiological changes that characterize it
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Reid’s push to legitimize the lie-detector test continued in 1956 with his
coauthored publication—again appearing in the Journal—The Selection and
Phrasing of Lie-Detector Control Questions.243 This time collaborating with
George W. Harman,244 Reid sought in this brief piece to clarify the utility and
corresponding disutility of certain questions used in his “control question”
approach to pre-polygraph examination interviews.245 The “control question” is
one designed “to afford the examiner a valid means of comparing the subject’s
responses to the questions pertaining to the matter under investigation with
those induced by a question calling for an answer which is a known lie or one
which the examiner may reasonably assume to be untrue.”246
Accompanied, as usual, by few footnotes and little (if any) supporting
experimental data,247 the authors propose explaining the purpose of the control
question to the test subject before asking a question—the answer to which
must always be “no.”248 Examiners should craft a question concerning “a
matter of lesser weight than the pertinent questions” and limit it to “the same
general area as the offense for which the subject is being tested.”249 Asking
effective control questions, conclude the authors, will allow the examiner to
assess the subject’s behavior symptoms in the context of the pre-polygraph
examination interview before beginning the substantive examination.250
Four years later, in 1962, the national media began to notice Reid’s work.
That year, parents of a thirteen-year-old child asked Reid to speak with their
boy.251 Reid administered a lie-detector test, after which he elicited an eightpage confession in which the boy admitted to starting a fire that killed ninety-

and only it.”). The American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs also analyzed the validity of
the polygraph in 1986. See Council Report, Polygraph, 256 JAMA 1172, 1175 (1986). The Council concluded
that there existed “enough false-positives and false-negatives to make many applications [of the polygraph],
perhaps even in criminal cases, of dubious value.” Id. at 1173. Even the NCAA’s infractions committee is
unwilling to utilize polygraphs. See Ed Sherman & Joseph Tybor, NCAA Skeptical About Polygraphs, Chi.
Trib., Feb. 27, 1990, at 1C.
243. Harman & Reid, Selection and Phrasing of Lie-Detector Questions, supra note 142.
244. Like Arther, Reid’s prior coauthor, Harman appears underqualified. The article credits Harman with
receiving an undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania and serving for four years as an officer
in the Army Intelligence Corps before receiving lie detection training from Reid. See id. at 578. He thereafter
served as a staff member in Reid’s Chicago office before leaving to become the director of the John E. Reid
and Associates’ San Francisco Office. See id.
245. The article spans a total of five pages. Id.
246. Id. at 578.
247. The article is supported by three footnotes, each of which cites one of Reid’s prior publications. See
id. at 578 n.1, 579 n.2, 582 n.3. Of course, the authors also thank Inbau in the author note. See id. at 578 n.*.
248. Id. at 578–79.
249. Id. at 579. There is no general example of a control question. Instead, the examiner should create
questions tailor-made to the suspect’s background. See id. (noting the examiner should “select[] an area of the
subject’s background from which to draw a tentative control question”).
250. Id. at 578 (“The introduction of the control question is best accomplished during the pre-test
interview with the subject, when the examiner is discussing the questions pertaining to the investigation.”).
251. Associated Press, Boy Questioned in Fire: Said to Confess Setting School 1958 Blaze Fatal to 95,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1962, at 46.
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five people in 1958 at Our Lady of the Angels School.252 Reid’s work, reported
in the Chicago Tribune253 and the New York Times, prompted the Times to
characterize him as “a nationally known expert on lie detectors.”254
That same year was also a significant scholarship year for both Inbau and
Reid, who published their first edition of Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions.255 The text no longer divided the lie detector and interrogation
techniques into separate subjects, choosing instead to focus exclusively on an
expanded treatment of interrogation methods.256 Consistent with their prior
writings on interrogation techniques, this book provides a laundry list of
observations—this time spanning from A to Z.257 Included within this iteration
are the authors’ familiar suggestions that interrogators, inter alia: (1) question
suspects in private and away from home,258 (2) display an air of confidence in
the suspect’s guilt,259 (3) minimize the moral seriousness of the offense by
blaming the victim or society,260 and (4) resort to tricking the suspect into
believing there exists more evidence of guilt than the investigators possess.261
The legal world became intimately familiar with these and other of Inbau
and Reid’s interrogation techniques when, in 1966, the Supreme Court
discussed and decried each of them in Miranda v. Arizona.262 Indeed, the
totality of techniques promoted by Inbau and Reid prompted the Supreme
Court to conclude that, even in the absence of employing the “third degree,”
“the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual
liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”263 Backed by an
uncharitable view of Reid and Inbau’s interrogation techniques,264 the Supreme

252. Id.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. Inbau & Reid, supra note 20.
256. Id. at ix–xii (Table of Contents). The authors elected to focus exclusively on interrogations because
“[a]n expanded treatment of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions and Lie Detection in one publication
would have resulted in a book that would be too bulky and perhaps too costly for readers with an interest in
only one or the other of the two separate subjects.” Id. at vii.
257. Id. at ix–x (Table of Contents).
258. Id. at 1 (“The principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy—
being alone with the person under interrogation.”).
259. Id. at 23 (“By an air of confidence we do not mean a supercilious or bullying attitude, but rather one
which will convey to the subject the impression that the interrogator is sure of himself.”).
260. Id. at 43.
261. Id. at 28. Equally as consistent with the authors’ prior interrogation writings, this expanded edition
relies on no psychological texts to support the assertions contained within. In fact, the text cites only two
books, titled Sexual Behavior in the Human Male and Sexual Behavior in the Human Female, solely to suggest
that interrogators rely on those books when seeking to minimize the moral seriousness of an individual’s
suspected conduct in a sex offense case. Id. at 36 n.2. The text otherwise contains only thirteen footnotes, most
of which either offer author observations, or reference legal doctrines.
262. 384 U.S. 436, 448–55 (1966) (discussing in detail the interrogation techniques outlined by the first
edition of Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions).
263. Id. at 455.
264. See, e.g., id. at 457–58 (“The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of
our Nation’s most cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.”);
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Court held that certain warnings must be provided to suspects before any
custodial interrogation in order to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.265
Although the Criminal Interrogation and Confession text troubled the
Supreme Court in 1966, it was the polygraph that fascinated the public two
years earlier. In 1964, Reid and Inbau were called to serve as witnesses in a
House Information Subcommittee inquiry into the federal government’s use of
lie detectors.266 In response to charges that the lie detector was “largely bunk,”
Inbau admitted “lie detector tests were ‘not susceptible to actual statistical
analysis’” yet still argued “‘a high degree of accuracy’ is attained when tests
are properly conducted.”267
In any event, Inbau and Reid’s cumulative high-profile exposure clarified
one thing: they were famous. The pair took advantage of their newfound fame
by publishing the first edition of their collaborative work, Truth and
Deception: The Polygraph (“Lie-Detector”) Technique in 1966.268 Then, one
year later, they responded to the Miranda decision by publishing the second
edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions.269 As to the former, the
publication sought again to establish the validity of Reid’s control-question
polygraph technique, the same technique he discussed in so many previous
Journal articles.270
And, as to the latter, Inbau and Reid specifically sought to incorporate the
warnings required by Miranda into their interrogation training techniques.271
Although the pair began the new edition by promptly admonishing
interrogators to provide the rights required by Miranda at the outset of any
custodial interrogation,272 the techniques discussed in prior editions—and
condemned by the Miranda Court273—changed little in form or substance.
Indeed, the 1967 iteration still counseled interrogators to (1) question suspects

Yale Kamisar, The Importance of Being Guilty, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 182, 195 (1977) (“The Miranda
opinion quotes from or cites the 1953 and 1962 Inbau-Reid manuals no less than ten times—and never with
approval.”).
265. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472. The Court required the now familiar warnings:
[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with
a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the
privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything
stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.
Id. at 471.
266. Lie Detector Hearings Set, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1964, at L15.
267. John D. Morris, House Unit Opens Polygraph Study: Rep. Gallagher, Denied Role, Charges a
‘Whitewash’, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1964, at 17.
268. Reid & Inbau, supra note 134.
269. Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation 2d ed., supra note 143.
270. Reid & Inbau, supra note 134, at 10–16; accord supra note 197 and accompanying text.
271. Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation 2d ed., supra note 143, at 4, 125.
272. Id. at 4.
273. See 384 U.S. 436, 448–55 (1966).
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in private and away from home,274 (2) display an air of confidence in the
suspect’s guilt,275 (3) minimize the moral seriousness of the offense by
blaming the victim or society,276 and (4) resort to tricking the suspect into
believing there exists more evidence of guilt than investigators possess.277 It
seems, then, that if Chief Justice Warren thought his majority opinion in
Miranda would materially change Inbau and Reid’s approach to interrogation,
he was woefully mistaken.278
Meanwhile, Reid continued his effort to bring the polygraph technique
into the mainstream. This time collaborating with colleague Fred Horvath,279
the pair published—again in the Journal—The Reliability of Polygraph
Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and Deception in 1971.280 Once again brief and
characteristically unsupported,281 this paper ostensibly reported the results of a
“study” on whether “[p]olygraph examiners, working independently of each
other, are able to successfully diagnose deception solely from an analysis of
Polygraph records.”282 According to Horvath and Reid, experienced polygraph
examiners successfully identified deception solely from polygraph results
91.4% of the time, whereas inexperienced examiners were correct in only
274. Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation 2d ed., supra note 143, at 5.
275. Id. at 26.
276. Id. at 47.
277. Id. at 32.
278. Amazingly, notwithstanding the absence of any material change in the Reid technique (and the
absence of credentials from its authors), the modern Supreme Court has cited the Manual with approval at least
twice. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 610 n.2 (2004) (“It is not the case, of course, that law
enforcement educators en masse are urging that Miranda be honored only in the breach.”) (citing Inbau, Reid
& Buckley, Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143, at 221); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324
(1994) (“It is well settled, then, that a police officer’s subjective view that the individual under questioning is a
suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in custody for purposes of
Miranda.”) (citing Inbau, Reid & Buckley, Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143, at 232, 236, 297–
98). Those citations are indeed unfortunate; the website for John E. Reid and Associates currently references
the cites and boasts that the Supreme Court believes the Reid technique exemplifies “proper training.” See
John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Company Information, supra note 2.
279. Frank Horvath graduated from Michigan State University with a B.S. in Police Administration.
Horvath & Reid, Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis, supra note 142, at 276. Following his
graduation, he undertook “the Study of Scientific Polygraph testing at John E. Reid and Associates” and
became a “Chief Examiner.” Id. Horvath’s dearth of credentials would later draw the ire of noted Professor of
Psychology, Saul M. Kassin, after Horvath performed a study purportedly demonstrating that training in the
Reid technique produced an eighty-five percent level of accuracy in detecting deception. Compare Frank
Horvath et al., Differentiation of Truthful and Deceptive Criminal Suspects in Behavior Analysis Interviews, 39
J. Forensic Sci. 793 (1994) (evaluating sixty interview tapes from the Reid interview collection and concluding
from the judgments of experienced in-house staff members that the Reid technique produced accurate results),
with Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confessions, 4 Ann. Rev. L. Soc. Sci. 193, 197 (2008) (noting that
Horvath’s study is “grossly out of step with basic science”).
280. Horvath & Reid, Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis, supra note 142. As always, Reid
thanked Inbau “for his assistance and suggestions.” Id. at 281.
281. The paper is five pages long and supported by five footnotes, two of which rely on prior Reid
publications. Id. at 276–81 nn.4, 5. Moreover, the “data” utilized in this study is self-created. Reid asked
polygraph examiners to analyze polygraph records—generated by Horvath—to assess deception. Id. at 276–
77. Then, Reid or Horvath determined the accuracy of those determinations. Id. at 277.
282. Id. at 276.
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79.1% of cases.283 From these numbers, the authors first conclude, “Polygraph
examiners . . . can reliably diagnose truth and deception or detect the guilty and
identify the innocent solely from an analysis of Polygraph records.”284
Additionally, say Horvath and Reid, the data reflects the importance “of
practice experience in qualifying examiners as experts.”285
Reid’s work to establish the polygraph as a mainstream lie detection
device paid off that same year. On November 21, 1971, the New York Times
ran a lengthy front-page article discussing the rising popularity among
employers—public or private—of using the polygraph to weed out dishonest
prospective and current employees.286 In the article, Reid boasted that his
company “get[s] better results than a priest does.”287 The article prominently
featured his coauthored polygraph text with Inbau, Truth and Deception, and
referred to it as the “standard text book on the lie detector.”288 Although the
article concluded by observing that an emerging body of studies challenged the
accuracy of polygraph test results, it never explored or commented on Reid’s
background.
Reid published his final article in the Journal one year later, titled The
Polygraph Silent Answer Test, again with Horvath.289 This lightly cited eightpage paper analyzed the “silent answer test,” in which “the subject is told to
listen to each test question and to answer only to himself silently.”290 Given
that individuals ordinarily answer questions aloud when asked, the silent
answer test will ideally produce in the suspect an emotional reaction that will
reflect truth or deception on the polygraph chart.291 It should, say the authors,
follow the oral test and the examiner should re-ask the questions in the exact
same order.292 If administered properly, the silent answer test “materially
increase[s] the accuracy of the Polygraph technique.”293

283. Id. at 279.
284. Id. at 281.
285. Id. Presumably, the totality of this article is actually a thinly veiled effort to support Inbau and Reid’s
long-held belief that blame for any inaccurate results produced by the lie-detector technique resides with the
examiner rather than the machine or method of questioning. See infra note 355 and accompanying text; see
also Morris, supra note 267 (reporting Inbau’s comments about the polygraph: “‘a high degree of accuracy’ is
attained when tests are properly conducted”). In a separate earlier publication, Reid and Inbau went as far as to
suggest that competent polygraph examiners should received “instruction in the pertinent phases of
psychology.” See Inbau & Reid, Lie-Detector Technique: Reliable and Valuable, supra note 142. Those
comments are of course ironic when juxtaposed with Reid and Inbau’s own backgrounds.
286. Ben A. Franklin, Lie Detector’s Use by Industry Rises; Rights Peril Feared, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
1971, at 1.
287. Id. at 45.
288. Id.
289. Horvath & Reid, Polygraph Silent Answer Test, supra note 142.
290. Id. at 285. The paper contains five footnotes, one of which relies on the first edition of Reid’s
coauthored Truth and Deception text. See id. at 285–90, 286 n.2.
291. Id. at 286.
292. Id. at 287.
293. Id. at 293.
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Although Reid’s effort again contained no scientific or empirical support,
his work nevertheless progressively gained more credibility in the media
throughout the 1970s for the polygraph’s role in (1) the Watergate scandal,294
(2) discovering who leaked sensitive American Medical Association
documents to reporters,295 and (3) shutting down a high-profile libel lawsuit
filed by James Earl Ray (the convicted killer of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).296
A second and final edition of Truth and Deception in 1976 helped further
solidify the utility of Reid’s approach to polygraph examinations.297
Although Reid passed away in 1982, he managed to collaborate on a
portion of the 1986 third edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions.298
That edition is, in the words of its authors, “basically an entirely new book.”299
The edition adds, revises, and rearranges a number of earlier published
techniques and synthesizes them into “nine steps toward effective
interrogation.”300 According to coauthors Inbau and Joseph P. Buckley,
“[t]hese developments are due primarily to the skill and ingenuity of . . . John
E. Reid.”301 In addition to debuting the new nine-step interrogation technique,
this edition for the first (and only) time included an appendix—written by
someone without a degree in psychology302—to elaborate on the psychological
principles of criminal interrogation.303
This final product—in the form of the nine-step Reid technique—
completes the house of cards: authors with no empirical authority created the
technique, it lacks supporting experimental data, and it is not recognized by the
scientific community. Yet, as the current 2001 version implicitly notes,
observations by Reid are evidently the only prerequisites necessary to create an
interrogation training empire: “[a]s a result of many years of experience,
primarily on the part of the staff of John E. Reid & Associates under the
guidance of the late John E. Reid, the interrogation process has been

294. Christopher Lydon, Colson Reported Passing a Lie Test on Watergate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1973, at
1.
295. David Burnham, 4 A.M.A. Employes [sic] Quizzed on Leak: Lie Detector Tests Given to Discover the
Source, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1975, at 13.
296. Associated Press, Ray Files a Libel Suit Against Playboy but Is Told to Withdraw It, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 16, 1977, at 29.
297. Reid & Inbau, Truth and Deception 2d ed., supra note 143. Arguably, psychologist David Lykken’s
development of the “Guilty Knowledge Test” is one reason that no subsequent editions of Truth and Deception
were published. See Richard H. Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the Hot Iron to the Lie Detector, 84 Ky.
L.J. 597, 630 (1995). Lykken criticized Reid’s control question method, noting that subjects could beat the
control question method by altering their physiological reactions to control questions. Id. at 630 n.139.
298. Inbau, Reid & Buckley, Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143, at v.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Brian C. Jayne is the author credited with drafting the appendix. See id. at 327. As noted, he does not
possess a recognized graduate degree and does not even have an undergraduate degree in psychology. See
supra note 112.
303. Inbau, Reid & Buckley, Criminal Interrogation 3d ed., supra note 143, at 325–47.
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formulated into nine structural components—the nine steps of criminal
interrogation.”304

III. Why Confessions Obtained Pursuant to the Reid Method Are
Inadmissible
The totality of the discussion of Inbau and Reid’s lifelong work in
polygraph and interrogation techniques should unequivocally demonstrate one
thing: all of their “scientific” and “psychological” work is collectively based
on nothing more than the mere observations—rather than experimental data—
of two people who possessed only law degrees.305 Reid’s work focused almost
exclusively on revising how to conduct polygraph testing despite the
judiciary’s continual and uniform rejection of polygraph results306—a rejection
that began nearly twenty years before Reid began his work on the lie-detector
technique.307 Although the foundation of that discredited technique underlies
the modern nine-step Reid technique, police continue to learn it and obtain
confessions by using it. Section A makes the perhaps self-evident assertion that
if the results of a polygraph are inadmissible in court, then so too should be
confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid method.
Section B then separately argues that the Reid method’s claimed basis in
psychology requires that it comport with the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.308 and Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael.309 Those decisions provide the test for how to assess the validity
of expert evidence. The Reid technique—premised exclusively on its creators’
observations—utterly fails that test. Section B therefore argues that all
interrogator testimony about confessions obtained pursuant to the Reid method
is inadmissible.
A. Polygraph Results Are Inadmissible in Court; So Too, Then, Should Be
the Results of Confessions Obtained Pursuant to the Reid Method
The relationship between the polygraph exam and the courts has
historically been a tumultuous one. The first appellate court to consider the
admissibility of polygraph results was the D.C. Circuit in its 1923 Frye v.
United States opinion.310 In Frye, the defendant confessed to murder but

304. Id. at 212.
305. At least one justice has questioned the validity of the techniques espoused by the Reid technique on
this exact basis. See State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134, 164 n.1 (N.C. 1983) (Exum, J., dissenting) (“Although
[Criminal Interrogation and Confessions] has a section on the law governing the admissibility of confessions,
the greater part of the book is nothing more than a police manual suggesting methods of interrogation.”), rev’d
sub nom. Jackson v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 1077 (1987).
306. See supra note 26.
307. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
308. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
309. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
310. 293 F. 1013.
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subsequently sought to repudiate his confession.311 For support, he offered
results from a primitive version of a polygraph test—better known then as the
systolic blood pressure deception test312—which supported his claim of
innocence.313 In rejecting the defendant’s proffer, the Frye court held that
results from the systolic blood pressure deception test were inadmissible given
that the test was not sufficiently recognized in the scientific community.314 In
doing so, the court outlined a test that would govern the admissibility of expert
scientific evidence for nearly seven decades: to be admissible, expert scientific
evidence “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs.”315
Courts nationwide responded to Frye with uniform skepticism of lie
detectors.316 The majority of post-Frye courts imposed a per se ban on
polygraph results out of concern that such results were unreliable and,
moreover, could unduly invade the province of the jury as fact-finder.317 A
handful of courts, however, admitted polygraph results for limited purposes or
upon stipulation of the parties.318
In 1993, the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.319 altered the standards governing the admissibility of
expert scientific testimony. In Daubert, the Court concluded that the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence—Rules 403, 703, and

311. James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation—Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and
Daubert, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 366 n.13.
312. Frye, 293 F. at 1013. The systolic blood pressure test, in the court’s words, was premised on the
notion
that conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear
of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve,
which corresponds exactly to the struggle going on in the subject’s mind, between fear and
attempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the vital points in respect of which he is
attempting to deceive the examiner.
Id. at 1013–14.
313. McCall, supra note 311.
314. 293 F. at 1014.
315. Id.
316. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 n.7 (1998) (“Until quite recently, federal and state
courts were uniform in categorically ruling polygraph evidence inadmissible under the [Frye] test . . . .”).
317. See, e.g., People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1079 (Ill. 1981) (“Polygraph evidence is not reliable
enough to be admitted.”); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 1991) (“The results of
polygraph examinations are unreliable and are therefore inadmissible in evidence.”); People v. Leone, 255
N.E.2d 696, 700 (N.Y. 1969) (concluding that reliability of the polygraph was unproven); Fulton v. State, 541
P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (commenting on “the potential unreliability of polygraph
examinations”); Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth, 115 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (“The
reliability and scientific infallibility of the polygraph . . . must be more definitely established before our courts
will accept their results as credible.”); Lee v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Va. 1958) (“[Polygraph]
tests generally have not as yet been proved scientifically reliable . . . .”).
318. Timothy B. Henseler, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake of
Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1247, 1248 & nn.7–8 (1997).
319. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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especially 702320—supplanted the Frye test.321 In an effort to assist federal
courts in applying Rule 702, the Supreme Court advised courts to consider the
following nonexhaustive list of analytical factors: (1) “whether [the proposed
scientific knowledge] can be (and has been) tested,” (2) “whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication,” (3) “the known
or potential rate of error,” and (4) whether the science has achieved “general
acceptance” in the relevant scientific community.322
The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert was of course binding only on
federal courts; state courts remained free to continue utilizing the Frye test.323
Regardless of whether jurisdictions applied Daubert or Frye, though, the
consensus among many was that Daubert’s logic might allow courts to
reconsider the propriety of a per se ban on the admission of polygraph
evidence.324 Although for a time that belief seemed prophetic,325 the trend died
quickly.

320. Id. at 594–95 (noting that in addition to complying with Rule 702, judges must “be mindful of other
applicable rules”). Then-applicable Rule 702, addressing the admissibility of scientific evidence, provided: “If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1993). The current
version of Rule 702 largely incorporates Daubert’s factors:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
321. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (agreeing with petitioners’ contention that “the Frye test was superseded by
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
322. Id. at 593–94.
323. See, e.g., State v. Harrod, 26 P.3d 492, 500 n.7 (Ariz. 2001) (“We have long held [polygraph
evidence] to be inadmissible under the Frye standard.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Harrod v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 953 (2002); People v. Wilkinson, 94 P.3d 551, 565 (Cal. 2004) (relying on state legislative
ban on polygraph evidence); People v. Lyons, 907 P.2d 708, 712 (Colo. App. 1995) (observing that Daubert
interpreted only the Federal Constitution and reaffirming Colorado’s per se ban on polygraph evidence); State
v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 745 (Conn. 1997) (“Because Daubert was premised on an interpretation of a federal
rule of evidence, its rejection of Frye is not binding authority on state courts.”); State v. Trevino, 980 P.2d 552,
557 (Idaho 1999) (rejecting defendant’s claim that Daubert requires a hearing on polygraph admissibility);
State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 952, 955 (Kan. 2000) (“The general acceptance test of Frye governs the
admissibility of expert scientific evidence in Kansas in those situations wherein such a test or standard is
required.”); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duguay, 720 N.E.2d 458 (Mass. 1999); Humphrey v. State, 759
So. 2d 368 (Miss. 2000); People v. Franks, 761 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2003); Paxton v. State, 867 P.2d 1309 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1993); State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093 (R.I. 2004); State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. 1999);
Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. App. 2005);
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997); State v. Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486 (W. Va. 1995); State v. Steven G.
B., No. 93-1658-CR, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1032 (Ct. App. July 31, 1996).
324. McCall, supra note 311, at 365 (noting, in 1996, that some federal courts “have begun to reconsider
and reject” a per se ban on polygraph testimony post Daubert).
325. See, e.g., United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting per se ban on
polygraph in light of Daubert); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[Per se rule]
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Why did the polygraph fail to earn judicial acceptance? The Supreme
Court’s 1998 decision in United States v. Scheffer326 seemingly provides at
least a partial answer. In Scheffer, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Military Rule of Evidence 707, which categorically disallowed the admission
of polygraph evidence in courts-martial.327 In doing so, the Court clearly
expressed the disdain it held for the polygraph by noting that “there is simply
no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner’s
conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even
the best polygraph exams.”328 Rule 707, said the Court, was “a rational and
proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence.”329 The Scheffer decision therefore offered additional ammunition to
reviewing courts seeking to summarily bar polygraph evidence from their
courtrooms.330
Wholly apart from Daubert and Scheffer, some courts continued to
reason, like several post-Frye decisions had before them,331 that introducing
polygraph results divested the jury of the opportunity to evaluate witness
credibility.332 Regardless of the test employed, however, federal and state

excluding unstipulated polygraph evidence is inconsistent with the ‘flexible inquiry’ assigned to the trial judge
by Daubert.”); United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 1995) (“After Daubert, a per se rule is not
viable.”); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1995) (“The Court finds that polygraph
evidence is sufficiently reliable under Daubert to be admitted as scientific evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 702.”).
326. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
327. Id. at 317.
328. Id. at 312.
329. Id. (emphasis added).
330. Indeed, at first, the Daubert factors seemingly offered the appropriate analytical roadmap for
evaluating the admissibility of polygraph evidence. See David Gallai, Polygraph Evidence in Federal Courts:
Should It Be Admissible, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 87, 93–101 (1999) (collecting cases and evaluating
polygraph’s admissibility pursuant to the Daubert factors before concluding that polygraph results are
inadmissible in federal court). Yet, based on the Supreme Court’s unfavorable comments about the polygraph
in Scheffer, subsequent reviewing courts seemed free to summarily dispose of arguments in favor of polygraph
admissibility with little or no analysis. See, e.g., Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying
on Scheffer to summarily reject the use of polygraph reports in immigration proceedings); United States v.
Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 468–69 (6th Cir. 2006) (relying in part on Scheffer to affirm the denial of disclosure to
defendant that his codefendant failed a lie-detector test); Ortega v. United States, 270 F.3d 540, 548 (8th Cir.
2001) (relying on Scheffer to reverse government’s attempt to base obstruction sentencing enhancement on
polygraph’s result); United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[Scheffer] recently held that
such per se bans on polygraph tests are permissible.”); United States v. Godin, 563 F. Supp. 2d 299, 300 (D.
Me. 2008) (relying in part on Scheffer to summarily deny defendant’s request for public funds to allow him to
submit to a presentencing polygraph examination); United States v. Canter, 338 F. Supp. 2d 460, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“While the Court is mindful that Scheffer involved a challenge to a military rule of evidence,
the Court finds the Scheffer Court’s rationale and discussion of the reliability of polygraph evidence no less
germane or compelling.”).
331. See supra note 317.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Swayze, 378 F.3d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When two witnesses
contradict each other, juries, not polygraph tests, determine who is testifying truthfully.”); United States v.
Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[Polygraph evidence] is often excluded because it usurps a
critical function of the jury and because it is not helpful to the jury, which is capable of making its own
determination regarding credibility.”); State v. Engelhardt, 119 P.3d 1148, 1166 (Kan. 2005) (noting that the
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courts most often thematically recognize one simple fact about polygraph
evidence: it remains unreliable.333
Judges nationwide rightly reject polygraph evidence because there exists
no “science” behind the detection of deception. The follow-up question seems
obvious: why is all of this discussion about polygraphs relevant if this Article
is about interrogation techniques? Answering that question should be equally
as obvious: the Reid method of interrogation is designed to accomplish the
same goal as the polygraph—to detect deception by subjects.334
Professor Richard A. Leo335 has previously argued that the Behavior
Analysis Interview in particular is “premised on the same underlying theory as
the polygraph: that the act of deception produces regular and discernable stress
reactions in normally socialized individuals.”336 Yet, as Professor Leo
observes, “[b]ecause no physiological or psychological response unique to
lying (and never present in truthfulness) has ever been discovered, the theory
of the polygraph and the Behavior Analysis Interview remains prima facie
implausible, leaving both diagnostic methods especially prone to problems of
interpreter bias, validity, reliability and false positive outcomes.”337 Most
problematically, Professor Leo notes, “the data that Reid and Associates cite as
support for the efficacy of the Behavioral Analysis interview have never been
made public, and (assuming they even exist) they would appear to be little
more than an accumulation of unsystematic, post hoc observations intended to
verify their own preconceptions.”338

rule banning expert testimony about the polygraph is “attributable in part . . . to protection of the jury’s role as
the factfinder”).
333. See, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that polygraph
results are “inherently unreliable”); United States v. Cordoba, 991 F. Supp. 1199, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“The
court finds polygraphy has not achieved general acceptance in the scientific community for courtroom use, the
error rate for real-life polygraph tests is unknown, and there are no controlling standards for polygraphy.”),
aff’d, 194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(“[P]olygraph evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible in a criminal trial or pre-trial hearing.”);
State v. Ulland, 943 P.2d 947, 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“Absent a stipulation of the parties, the results of a
polygraph examination are too unreliable to be admissible at trial.”).
334. See generally Minzner, supra note 22 (describing the Reid technique as a method used for
determining lie detection).
335. Professor Leo is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School of Law and
formerly a professor of psychology and criminology at the University of California, Irvine. Richard A. Leo,
Ph.D.,
J.D.
Curriculum
Vitae
(Dec.
2009),
available
at
http://www.law.usfca.edu/
faculty/fulltime/cv/leor.pdf. He has written five books and more than fifty articles on police interrogation
practices, false confessions, and wrongful convictions. Id. Professor Leo holds both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in
Jurisprudence and Social Policy (with a specialization in criminology and social psychology). Id.
336. Leo, supra note 4, at 66; see Kassin, supra note 279, at 197 (“To help investigators determine
whether their suspects are telling the truth or lying, Inbau et al. (2001) train investigators to use the Behavior
Analysis Interview, or BAI.”); see also White, supra note 22, at 26 (“[T]he Manual instructs an interrogator as
to how she can determine whether a suspect is guilty . . . .”).
337. Leo, supra note 4, at 67; accord Kassin, supra note 279, at 197 (“[T]here is also no evidence to
support the diagnostic value of the verbal and nonverbal cues that investigators are trained to observe.”).
338. Leo, supra note 4, at 67 (emphasis added).
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The nine-step interrogation technique that would ordinarily follow the
Behavior Analysis Interview—if the interrogator remains convinced of the
subject’s guilt—has garnered similar substantial criticism for its inability to
accurately assess or detect deception.339 Psychology Professors Saul M. Kassin
and Christina T. Fong performed an experiment in 1999 studying individuals’
ability to accurately assess guilt or innocence.340 At the outset, the pair
observed that, like the Behavior Analysis Interview, the nine-step interrogation
method that followed was similarly designed to aid interrogators in detecting
deception.341
More substantively, Professors Kassin and Fong videotaped one group of
participants interrogated pursuant to the Reid method to determine whether
they committed a mock crime.342 A second group of participants, some of
whom were trained in the Reid method, watched the videos and opined on (1)
the guilt or innocence of each subject, and (2) their confidence in their
assessment of guilt or innocence.343 The results were as predictable as they
were disturbing: First, judgment accuracy rates were comparable to chance.344
Second, “training in the use of verbal and nonverbal cues did not improve
judgment accuracy.”345 In an effort to explain why training did nothing to
improve judgment accuracy, the authors stated pointedly, “there is no solid
empirical basis for the proposition that these same cues reliably discriminate
between criminals and innocent persons accused of crimes they did not
commit.”346
Finally, the authors reported, participants were over-confident in their
assessment of guilt or innocence.347 In the authors’ words:
[W]e found among both trained and naive participants that judgment
accuracy and confidence were not significantly correlated, regardless of
whether the measure of confidence was taken before, after, or during the
task. Further demonstrating the meta-cognitive problems in this domain is
that confidence ratings were positively correlated with the number of reasons
(including Reid-based reasons) articulated as a basis for judgments, another
dependent measure not predictive of accuracy. Training had a particularly
adverse effect in this regard. Specifically, those who were trained compared
to those in the naive condition were less accurate in their judgments of truth
and deception. Yet they were more self-confident and more articulate about
the reasons for their often erroneous judgments.348

339. E.g., Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 514.
340. Id. at 499.
341. Id. at 500 (observing that the Reid technique specifically trains interrogators “on the analysis of
verbal and nonverbal cues to deception”).
342. Id. at 501.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 511.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 511–12.
347. Id. at 512.
348. Id. (emphasis added). The study’s authors performed their experiments in 1999. Selection of this
older study for this Article was intentional; indeed, one should feel uncomfortable knowing that society has
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Accordingly, they conclude, “[w]ith regard to the finding that training in the
Reid technique did not increase accuracy, the results are unambiguous.”349
This analysis should sound eerily familiar. The polygraph machine is
designed to detect deception; remember, Reid himself once bragged that his
company “get[s] better results than a priest does.”350 Remember also Reid’s
claim that “when properly used,” the lie-detector technique has “an accuracy of
95%.”351 And, of course, think back to the considerable attention Reid and
Inbau collectively received in the media for their lie-detector method.352
Notwithstanding Reid and Inbau’s protestations of accuracy, think now of
the judiciary’s response to their lie-detector technique: polygraph results are
inadmissible. Why again? Because since 1923, polygraph examiners (Reid
included) have been unable to consistently convince anyone—including the
courts—that the “science” underlying the polygraph should translate into
admissible evidence.353 Society should be particularly thankful for the
appellate judiciary’s wisdom; if you remain unconvinced, then flip back a few
pages and double-check the research underlying Reid’s lie-detector
technique.354 The absence of research to support that technique confirms what
seems uniformly obvious to professors, social scientists, and psychologists
alike: there exists no physiological or psychological response unique to lying.
One more obvious point bears mentioning: there is a difference between those
who talk about science and psychology and those who are credentialed to do
so.355

had access to this information for a decade now, yet courts continue to routinely admit confessions obtained
pursuant to the Reid method. For those wishing to confirm that the results of Kassin and Fong’s study are far
from anomalous, see Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities (2d ed. 2008); Charles
F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 214
(2006); and Aldert Vrij et al., An Empirical Test of the Behaviour Analysis Interview, 30 Law & Hum. Behav.
329 (2006).
349. Kassin and Fong, supra note 25, at 512; accord Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 38
(discussing psychological tests demonstrating that people who have undergone training in judging the accuracy
of confessions are “significantly less accurate than those who did not [undergo the training]—though they
were more confident in their judgments [of guilt or innocence]”).
350. Franklin, supra note 286, at 45.
351. Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in Paternity Cases, supra note142, at 216 n.5.
352. See Associated Press, supra note 296, at 31; Burnham, supra note 295, at 13; Lydon, supra note 294,
at 1.
353. Compare Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (rejecting primitive lie detector
device because it had not achieved “general acceptance” in the scientific community), with United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998) (“[C]ertain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph
exams.”).
354. See supra notes 197–215 and accompanying text.
355. Paradoxically, although Reid and Inbau lacked the psychology training presumably required to create
psychological interrogation methods, they nevertheless suggested that polygraph examiners possess a variety
of credentials before courts should accept the results of their testing into evidence. See People v. Leone, 255
N.E.2d 696, 699 n.4 (N.Y. 1969) (“Reid and Inbau suggest that before permitting the results of a polygraph
examination into evidence, the courts should require that (1) the examiner have a college degree; (2) that he
have six months of internship training; (3) that he have at least five years’ experience as a specialist in the field
of lie detection; and (4) that the examiner’s testimony be based upon polygraph records that he produces in
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But an illogical disconnect persists. Like the polygraph or lie-detector
technique, the Reid method of interrogation is designed to detect deception.
And, like studies reflecting that the polygraph is about as accurate as flipping a
coin,356 other studies reflect similar rates of accurate guilt or innocence
assessments by interrogators trained in the Reid method.357 Yet, unlike the
judiciary’s unwillingness to admit polygraph evidence, judges routinely admit
confessions taken pursuant to the Reid method, without inquiring into the basis
for Reid and Inbau’s claim that their methods introduced “science” into the
interrogation room.358
The admission of confessions obtained by quasi science is problematic
given the simple analysis that should lead courts to wholly reject the Reid
interrogation method. If courts since 1923 have consistently rejected the
polygraph exam,359 then logic dictates rejecting the Reid method of
interrogation for identical reasons. Similar logic dictates one final troubling
conclusion: because the judiciary had already firmly rejected the polygraph
method long before Inbau utilized similar methodology in 1942 to formulate
what is now the Reid technique, no court should ever admit a confession
obtained pursuant to the Reid method against a confessing defendant.
B. Apart from the Polygraph, the Reid Technique Itself Is Premised on
Inadmissible Junk Science
Most defense challenges to confessions focus on the possibility that
methods endorsed by the Reid technique induced their client to confess
falsely.360 Intuitively, this makes sense: a warehouse full of research reflects
court and which are available for cross-examination purposes.”); see Arther & Reid, Lie Detector in Paternity
Cases, supra note 142, at 216 n.5 (“Far less accuracy will prevail, however, when the examiner is lacking in
basic qualifications, adequate training, sufficient experience, general competence, or complete honesty.”).
356. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
357. E.g., Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 512; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 46, at 40.
358. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, No. B154557, 2003
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11981, at *51 (Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2003) (upholding confession taken pursuant to the
Reid technique despite noting that it “undoubtedly pressured appellant to admit his involvement”); State v.
Cobb, 43 P.3d 855, 863 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting defendant’s argument that application of the Reid
technique rendered his confession involuntary); State v. Gevan, No. C9–02–443, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS
1014, at *9 (Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2002) (“While deceit and trickery are not condoned police practices, confessions
obtained with this technique are admissible so long as the specific practices used do not ‘shock the conscience’
or risk inducing a false confession.”); State v. Gentry, No. C9–96–2344, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 1064, at
**10–11 (Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1997) (rejecting defendant’s voluntariness challenge); State v. Gardner, 80 P.3d
1262, 1270 (Mont. 2003) (upholding Reid confession where defendant failed to preserve the issue); State v.
Ulch, No. CR–00–1461, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1866, at *11 (Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002) (rejecting defendant’s
challenge that application of the Reid technique violates due process); State v. Isola, No. 42472–6–I, 1999
Wash. App. LEXIS 2018, at *4 (Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1999) (discussing Reid technique).
359. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“We think the systolic blood pressure
deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made.”).
360. See, e.g., People v. Son, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 883 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802,
810–11 (Minn. 1999); State v. Davis, 32 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
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the potential for the Reid technique to produce false confessions.361 Professor
Leo in particular has extensively documented the potential for modern
interrogation methods to produce false confessions.362 Professor Leo observes
that modern interrogation methods are “developed to manipulate the decisionmaking of a person who committed a crime,” yet false confessions arise
because of the “inappropriate, improper and inept use of the methods of
psychological interrogation.”363 For example, Professor Leo argues that police
“too frequently become so zealously committed to a preconceived belief in a
suspect’s guilt or so reliant on their interrogation methods that they mistakenly
extract an uncorroborated, inconsistent, and manifestly untrue confession.”364
Rather than dwell for too long on the Reid technique’s propensity to
cause false confessions, however, this section focuses more basically on the
admissibility of a confession obtained pursuant to the Reid method. In doing
so, it argues that interrogators certified in the Reid technique must be qualified
as experts before any confession obtained from a defendant pursuant to the
Reid method may be introduced against that defendant in court. Of course,
given the absence of an empirical scientific basis to support the Reid method,
no interrogator should be so qualified and, as a result, no confession obtained
pursuant to the Reid method should ever be admitted in court.
Reid and Inbau long claimed that their methods introduced
“psychological tactics” and “science” into the interrogation room.365 The
belief, by now no doubt familiar to the reader, was that interrogators could
learn to perceive deceptive responses in suspects merely by learning how to
discern deception from their behavioral responses.366 That view remains
unchanged today. Indeed, promotional materials for seminars given by John E.
Reid & Associates boast the ability to—in three-days, no less—teach students
“[h]ow to psychologically profile suspects for the interrogation.”367

361. See infra notes 362–63.
362. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891 (2004); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 479, 484–85; Richard A. Leo, False
Confessions and Miscarriages of Justice Today, in The American Criminal Justice System 169 (Richard A.
Leo ed., 1997); Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in The MIRANDA Debate: Law,
Justice and Policing 271 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas, III eds., 1998); Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s
Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence, Game, 30 Law & Soc’y Rev. 259, 269 (1996); Richard A.
Leo, Some Thoughts About Police and Crime, in The Crime Conundrum: Essays on Criminal Justice 121
(Lawrence Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of
False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 (1998); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the
Forest for the Trees: A Response to Paul Cassell’s “Balanced Approach” to the False Confession Problem, 74
Denv. U. L. Rev. 1135 (1997); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 25; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 22, at 189.
363. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 22, at 190.
364. Id. at 193.
365. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
366. Inbau et al., supra note 3, at 6–7.
367. John E. Reid & Assocs., Inc., Seminar Schedule 4 (2009) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.reid.com/training_programs/2009seminarbrochure.pdf.
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Taking the federal standard as an illustrative example,368 the first question
is whether the Reid technique’s attempted introduction of “psychological
tactics” into the interrogation room implicates Daubert’s applicability to
“scientific evidence.” Stated differently, is psychology a “science” such that
psychological testimony or evidence must comport with Federal Rule of
Evidence 702? That question is particularly important given that Daubert’s
limited holding “left open questions about whether [its] gatekeeping function
and reliability/relevance factors applied to such expert witnesses as airplane
pilots, beekeepers, real estate appraisers, accountants, auto mechanics—all of
whom have particular expertise and experience that might help a trier of fact,
but who are clearly not scientists.”369
At first, some post-Daubert courts were skeptical that Daubert’s
standards for admitting scientific evidence would extend to psychology.370
Rightly or wrongly, psychology was grouped with so-called “soft sciences,”
along with psychiatry, economics, anthropology, and sociology.371 These, of
course, are to be contrasted with the “hard sciences” like biology, physics, and
chemistry.372 The former, so the rationale went, were incapable of controlled
empirical testing and instead involved clinical or experiential data.373 Despite
the dissimilarities between them, however, some courts drew no distinction
between the two and applied Daubert to all expert testimony.374 Those courts,
as it turned out, were prophetic.
In 1999, the Supreme Court held in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael that
the trial judge’s role as “gatekeeper” applies not only to “scientific” testimony,
but to all expert testimony—including that premised on “‘technical’ and ‘other
specialized’ knowledge.”375 More specifically, Daubert applied to all “expert
368. This section relies on the federal judiciary and the Federal Rules of Evidence solely as an illustrative
example. Each state of course has its own rules of evidence, which include rules governing the admission of
expert evidence.
369. Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of “Future Dangerousness” Predictions in
Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37 Akron L. Rev. 469, 496 (2004).
370. See, e.g., United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Daubert
analysis did not apply to a psychologist who testified on child sexual abuse because her testimony was a result
of interviewing many abuse victims, not on any scientific knowledge); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130
F.3d 1287, 1297 (8th Cir. 1997) (doubting the applicability of Daubert to “soft sciences” like psychology
because “there are social sciences in which the research, theories and opinions cannot have the exactness of
hard science methodologies”); United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342–43 (7th Cir. 1996) (remanding to
lower court to determine whether Daubert would allow psychiatric and social psychology testimony); United
States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1171 (2d Cir. 1993) (“‘[S]oft science’ expertise is less likely to
overwhelm the common sense of the average juror than ‘hard science’ expertise . . . .”); United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that Daubert was inapplicable to forensic
document examination testimony).
371. Janine M. Kern & Scott R. Swier, Daubert, Kumho, and Its Impact on South Dakota Jurisprudence:
An Update, 49 S.D. L. Rev. 217, 244 n.309 (2004).
372. Id.
373. David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Expertise and
Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 685, 723 n.220 (2000).
374. E.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995).
375. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
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matters described in Rule 702.”376 The Court reasoned that expert testimony
might include specialized observations, theory, or the application of a theory to
a particular case.377
As a prerequisite for admission, said the Court, there must exist a valid
connection between the testimony and “the pertinent inquiry.”378 And, when a
litigant challenges the “factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their
application,” the trial court “must determine whether the testimony has ‘a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’”379
Significantly, the Court suggested that a trial court could consider the factors it
outlined in Daubert “when doing so will help determine that testimony’s
reliability.”380
Analyzing the Reid technique from here seems straightforward. Given the
Reid technique’s claimed basis in “science” and “psychology” alongside
Kumho Tire’s reach into “soft sciences,” it is time for defense attorneys
nationwide to challenge the Reid method’s “factual basis, data, principles,
methods, or [its] application.”381 Assuming they do so, even a cursory look into
how the Daubert factors might apply to the Reid technique foretells the
defense bar’s success.
Daubert first suggests that trial courts evaluate “whether [the proposed
scientific knowledge] can be (and has been) tested.”382 Given that there exists
no physiological or psychological response unique to lying, testing the Reid
technique’s claimed ability to detect lies is a tough proposition. To begin with,
the inability to determine what constitutes ground truth suggests that testing the
Reid technique borders on the impossible. Moreover, as this Article has gone
to great lengths to note, there is no basis for the Reid method—scientific or
otherwise.383 Even if the Reid technique were grounded in sound scientific or

376. Id. at 149.
377. Id.
378. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)).
379. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
380. Id. at 141.
381. Id. at 149.
382. 509 U.S. at 593.
383. To be fair, Professor Leo recognizes that the Reid method relies on psychological techniques. See
Ofshe & Leo, supra note 22, at 190. The problem, however, is that the Reid technique stumbled into
psychology rather than basing the method on it. Cf. id. (blaming false confessions on the Reid method’s “inept
use of the methods of psychological interrogation”). Perhaps this sheds some light onto the false confession
problem; in other words, Inbau and Reid never reasonably considered the potential for their method to induce
false confessions simply because they could not. Given that the method itself was generated solely on
observations—rather than education—it seems eminently reasonable to assume that Inbau and Reid simply
lacked the training to consider whether their techniques could induce subjects to falsely confess.
Notwithstanding a similar absence of psychological or academic credentials, the modern Reid method authors
steadfastly maintain that the technique, if administered correctly, cannot produce false confessions. See Jayne
& Buckley, supra note 24, at 72 (“A psychologically healthy suspect will not engage in behavior that will
jeopardize [his] self-interests.”). But see People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941, 951–52 (Ill. 1992) (reversing
defendant’s conviction—premised on a false confession—where interrogator obtained defendant’s confession
only after he falsely told defendant that he failed a polygraph exam).
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psychological principles, how do we know that confessions—especially those
left uncorroborated—obtained pursuant to the Reid method are not false?
Second, Daubert suggests that trial courts evaluate “whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.”384 The first
question, of course, is who constitutes the relevant peer group? If it is
interrogators trained in the Reid method, then peer review naturally favors
admission. If, however, the relevant peer group is social psychologists, then
peer review disfavors admission.385 And, although Reid and Inbau have
published significantly on the Reid technique, their publications have not
appeared in any relevant journal recognized by the American Psychological
Association.386 It bears noting, however, that critics of the Reid technique have
consistently published in some of the most recognized psychology journals in
the nation.387
The final two Daubert factors require equally little discussion. The third
factor counsels courts to consider “the known or potential rate of error.”388
Determining known error rates for the Reid technique is likely impossible
given that the technique itself was not premised on published error rates.
Assessing known error would in any event require knowing the actual or
ground truth to determine whether interrogators successfully elicited a true
confession. Yet, as noted, studies reflect that training in the Reid technique did
not enhance an interrogator’s ability to detect deception in an individual.389
Recall Professor Kassin’s study revealing that learning the Reid technique may
be “counterproductive[] as a method of distinguishing truth and deception.”390
Finally, trial courts should consider whether the science has achieved
“general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community.391 Given Reid and
Inbau’s claim that the Reid technique is premised in psychology, the relevant
scientific community would appear to be psychologists. It would be hard
indeed to justify a group composed solely of Reid-trained interrogators
because the very fact that they use the Reid technique indicates that they accept
the “science.” Yet, as previously noted,392 psychologists may agree with Inbau

384. 509 U.S. at 593.
385. See Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 512.
386. Although Northwestern’s Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology is a giant in academic legal
circles, it is unsurprisingly not a publication recognized by the American Psychological Association. See APA
and Affiliated Journals, http://www.apa.org/journals/by_subject.html#social (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
387. See, e.g., Kassin & Fong, supra note 25 (publishing in Law & Human Behavior); Kassin et al., supra
note 30 (same); Saul M. Kassin et al., “I’d Know a False Confession if I Saw One”: A Comparative Study of
College Students and Police Investigators, 29 Law & Hum. Behav. 211 (2005) (same). The Law and Human
Behavior Journal has a rejection rate of seventy-six percent. See Summary Report of Journal Operations, 2008
(2008),
available
at
http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/
features/2008-operations.pdf.
388. 509 U.S. at 594.
389. See supra note 349.
390. Kassin & Fong, supra note 25, at 512.
391. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
392. See supra notes 362–64.
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that the Reid technique utilizes “psychological tactics,” but they dispute the
method’s claim that it can successfully avoid eliciting false confessions. In
sum, the Supreme Court has provided a test to assess the validity of expert
evidence and the Reid technique utterly fails that test. Any truly scientific
technique should, at a minimum, satisfy Daubert’s factors with ease.
The question of where to go from here is best saved for another day and
another article. Suffice it to say for now, though, that Reid and Inbau’s service
to this country cannot be overstated; indeed, suspects owe a debt of gratitude to
these two giants who successfully eradicated the “third degree” from
interrogation rooms nationwide. But we no longer live in the 1940s, and, not
surprisingly, we no longer drive 1940s automobiles, practice early-twentiethcentury medicine, or dial rotary phones. Why, then, are police still using 1940s
methods of interrogation? The time has come to shut down the profit-based
John E. Reid & Associates and replace it with an interdisciplinary effort that
relies on work published in credible psychology journals, written by
credentialed scholars.393

Conclusion
As my criminal procedure professor observed, “To question the propriety
of some of the interrogation methods recommended by Inbau and Reid in 1953
and ‘63 is not to deny that we owe the senior author a great deal for antiquating
the interrogation practices of ‘23 and ‘33.”394
I have no training or background in psychology. Common sense of course
suggests that I am therefore unqualified to teach even a basic psychology
course. Like me, Fred Inbau and John Reid have no psychological training or
background. They too, then, presumably could not have taught even a basic
psychology course. How then could they author the “Bible” for interrogation
training? The answer is as simple as it is disconcerting: they could not.
What then is the solution? Dispense with criminal interrogations as a
tool? Of course not. Instead, common sense should dictate that the Reid
method—although perhaps a helpful stopgap in 1942—is no more able to
reliably separate the innocent from the guilty now than it was at the time of its
creation. Just like any other profession, only individuals qualified in
psychology can opine on appropriate psychological interrogation methods.
Accordingly, the time has come to dispense with the Reid method’s
sweeping and unsupported presume-guilt approach in favor of creating a newer

393. The Author of this Article cannot help but wonder in passing what Reid and Inbau would think of the
modern John E. Reid & Associates. The company’s website suggests that its focus is more on financial gain
than anything else. Several aspects of the site push marketing phrases, seminar costs, or certification fees on
the viewer. See John E. Reid & Associates, http://www.reid.com/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (“If it doesn’t say
‘The Reid Technique®’ . . . it’s not John Reid & Associates!” (alteration in original)). That focus arguably
dishonors the tremendous social service both Reid and Inbau performed by professionalizing the police force
and moving it away from harsh “third degree” methods of interrogation.
394. Kamisar, supra note 177, at 733.
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more collaborative approach to interrogation methods. Only by assimilating
the experience of law enforcement and prosecutors along with criminal and
social psychologists can we create interrogation methods designed to produce
reliable and admissible confessions. Until then, all we can do is lament the
disconnect between the outdated Reid technique and the standards of
evidentiary admissibility.

